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Abstract
Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis ignores scal
policy and assumes that monetary policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow both
scal and monetary policy to be described by rules and/or optimal policy which are subject
to switches over time. We nd that US monetary and scal policy have often been in conict,
and that it is relatively rare that we observe the benign policy combination of an conservative
monetary policy paired with a debt stabilizing scal policy. In a series of counterfactuals, a
conservative central bank following a time-consistent scal policy leader would come close to
mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. However, if policy makers cannot credibly commit
to such a regime, monetary accommodation of the prevailing scal regime may actually be
welfare improving.
 JEL Codes:
 Key Words: Bayesian Estimation, interest rate rules, scal policy rules, optimal mone-
tary policy, optimal scal policy, great moderation, commitment, discretion
1 Introduction
The Great Moderationin output and ination volatility has been the subject of much analysis,
particularly for the US, where following Sims and Zha(2006) a large literature has emerged which
assesses the extent to which this was simply good luck- a favorable shift in shock volatilities - or
good policy- a desirable change in monetary policy rule parameters and/or the implicit ination
target. The improvement in policy making is typically associated with the Volcker disination
which tends to be dated as occurring in 1979.1 Despite the magnitude of the literature examining
this issue, there is very little work examining what role scal policy played in the development
of trend-ination. This is somewhat surprising when one contrasts the development of ination,
real interest rates and scal variables including the debt to GDP ratio (see Figure 1) where the
Address for correspondence: University of Glasgow, Economics, Adam Smith Business School, Gilbert
Scott Building, Glasgow G12 8QQ, U.K. E-mail: xiaoshan.chen@durham.ac.uk, eleeper@indiana.edu and camp-
bell.leith@glasgow.ac.uk. We would like to thank Chris Sims, Harald Uhlig, Tack Yun, Tao Zha and participants
at the 2015 Tsinghua-CAEPR conference on monetary and scal policy in Beijing for helpful comments.
1See Chen et al (2013) for a discussion of the various strands of this literature.
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upward trend in ination prior to the 1980s appears to be associated with a downward trend
in the debt to GDP ratio, while the moderation in ination came at a time of a step increase
in the real interest rate and rising debt to GDP ratio, at least until 1995. A notable exception
to this absence of scal policy in explaining the development of ination is Bianchi (2012) and
Bianchi and Ilut (2015) who build on the insights of Leeper (1991) to allow for switches in the
combination of monetary and scal policy rules over time.2 Essentially, they nd that prior to the
Volcker disination rising ination and falling debt to GDP levels are generated by a combination
of passive monetary policy (a Taylor rule which fails to satisfy the Taylor principle requiring that
real interest rates rise in response to rising ination) and an active scal policy (which fails to
adjust the surplus/decit to stabilize debt). There is then a period of policy conict following
the appointment of Volcker as monetary policy turns active, while scal policy still fails to act to
stabilize the debt before scal policy adjusts, turning passive in support of the post-Volcker anti-
ination policies of the Fed. This benign policy conguration then explains the fall in ination
in the 1980s, but is associated with rising debt levels.
Our current paper builds on this analysis in several ways. Firstly, we consider other types
of policy making in addition to simple policy rules. Specically, we allow monetary policy to
be conducted optimally under discretion, but with uctuations in the degree of ination conser-
vatism. We also allow scal policy to transition between active/passive scal rules and optimal
time-consistent policy making where the scal authority acts as a Stackelberg leader in a game
with the optimizing monetary authority. We nd that this set of potential policy regimes o¤ers
a data-preferred description of monetary and scal policy relative to the usual rules-based ap-
proach. The paper also develops a new algorithm for solving the strategic policy game between
the monetary and scal policy makers in the face of shifts in regime.
Secondly, we extend the policy space to allow for more potential permutations of regime.
Both Bianchi (2012) and Bianchi and Ilut (2015) restrict their attention to three regimes -
the benign regime where monetary policy actively targets ination, and scal policy adjusts the
decit to stabilize debt (AM/PF), a less benign regime where monetary policy fails to actively
target ination possibly in order to support a scal policy which does not seek to stabilize debt
through adjusting scal instruments (PM/AF) and a transitory regime where the two policies are
in conict with the monetary authority targeting ination, and neither policy maker acting to
stabilize debt (AM/AF). We consider a richer set of policy regime permutations and transitions
across regimes. When we consider rules, we allow for the possible missing permutation of PM/PF.
We also do not restrict the transition across regimes. Therefore it is not necessary to transition
through the AM/AF regime when moving from badto goodregimes, PM/AF to AM/PF as
in Bianchi and Ilut (2015), nor assuming a circular regime transition structure as in Bianchi
(2012).This richer set of policy permutations and less restrictive transition paths adds some
nuances to the description of the evolution of monetary and scal policies over the period and we
tend to nd that policy was in conict more often than found in the analysis of Bianchi (2012)
and Bianchi and Ilut(2015).
When we turn to consider time-consistent optimal policy where the scal authority may move
2Related papers which allow for regime switching in estimated scal policy processes prior to embedding them in
a calibrated model include Davig (2004) and Davig and Leeper (2011). Traum and Yang (2010) implicitly consider
switches in policy by estimating a DSGE model with xed rules over sub-samples with priors favoring the AM/PF
and PM/AF policy premutations, respectively.
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between scal rules and acting as a Stackelberg leader which the monetary authority implements
a time-consistent monetary policy with switches in the degree of conservatism, which turns out
to be a data-preferred description of policy, the movement between regimes is more striking and
it is rare that policy combinations conform to the usual Active/Passive pairings. There can also
be substantial spillovers across regimes, with a scal authority behaving optimally conducting
policy in a manner which takes into account the possible switches to a passive scal rule. This
latter phenomenon is driven by the inationary impact of alternative tax policies given that taxes
are distortionary. Bianchi (2012) and Bianchi and Ilut (2015) assume lump-sum taxation.
Thirdly, by allowing for policy to be conducted optimally we obtain estimates of policy maker
objective functions which allow us to construct a rich set of counterfactual analyses which include
a consideration of welfare. Therefore we can distinguish between good luck and, whether for
monetary or scal policy, good policy, improved credibility and/or avoidance of conict are more
important in re-examining the great moderation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe our New Keynesian model
augmented to include medium term government debt. Section 3 outlines the various descriptions
of policy we consider before we outline our estimation approach and results in Section 4. Section
5 then undertakes a series of counterfactual exercises, before we conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
The economy is comprised of households, a monopolistically competitive production sector, and
the government. There is a continuum of goods that enter the householdsconsumption basket.
Households form external consumption habits at the level of the consumption basket as a whole -
supercialhabits.3 Furthermore, we assume the economy is subject to both price and ination
inertia. Both e¤ects have been found to be important in capturing the hump-shaped responses of
output and ination to shocks evident in VAR based studies, and are often employed in empirical
applications of the New Keynesian model.4
On the scal side we allow the government to levy a tax on rmssales revenue, which in
our simple model is equivalent to a tax on all labour and prot income. These revenues are
used to nance government consumption, pay for transfers to households and service/manage
the outstanding stock of government debt. Unlike much theoretical analysis, we allow the gov-
ernment to issue a portfolio of bonds of di¤erent maturity where we will impose a geometrically
declining maturity structure to tractably enable us to price bonds of di¤erent maturities within
the portfolio.
3For a comparison of the implications for optimal policy of alternative forms of habits see Amato and Laubach
(2004) and Leith et al (2012).
4See for example Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans(2005) and Leith and Malley
(2005).
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2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by k and of measure 1. House-
holds derive utility from consumption of a composite good, Ckt =
R 1
0
 
Ckit
  1
 di
 
 1
where 
the elasticity of substitution between the goods in this basket and su¤er disutility from hours
spent working, Nkt . Habits are both supercial and external implying that they are formed at the
level of the aggregate consumption good, and that households fail to take account of the impact
of their consumption decisions on the utility of others. To facilitate data-consistent detrending
around a balanced growth path without restricting preferences to be logarithmic in form, we follow
Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) and An and Schorfheide (2007) in assuming that the consumption
that enters the utility function is scaled by the economy wide technology trend, implying that the
households consumption norms rise with technology as well as being a¤ected by more familiar
habits externalities. Accordingly, households derive utility from the habit-adjusted composite
good,5
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where Ct 1 
R 1
0 C
k
t 1dk is the cross-sectional average of consumption. In other words households
gain utility from consuming more than other households, are disappointed if their consumption
doesnt grow in line with technical progress and are subject to a time-preference or taste-shock,
t.
The process for technology is non-stationary,
lnAt = ln  + lnAt 1 + ln qt (1)
ln qt = q ln qt 1 + "q;t (2)
Households decide the composition of the consumption basket to minimize expenditures and the
demand for individual good i is
Ckit =

Pit
Pt
 
Ckt =

Pit
Pt
  
Xkt + Ct 1

:
By aggregating across all households, we obtain the overall demand for good i as
Cit =
Z 1
0
Ckitdk =

Pit
Pt
 
Ct: (3)
Remainder of the Households Problem The remainder of the households problem is
standard. Specically, households choose the habit-adjusted consumption aggregate, Xkt =
5Note that this utility specication is slightly di¤erent from that in Lubik and Shorfheide (2005) who adopt
the following specication, (
Ct Ct 1)=At)1 (t) 
1  . Their specication introduces a technology shock into the
denition of habits adjusted consumption which then complicates the derivation of welfare.
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Ckt =At Ct 1=At 1, hours worked, Nkt , and the portfolio allocation, BS;kt and BM;kt , to maximize
expected lifetime utility
E0
1X
t=0
t
" 
Xkt
1 
(t)
 
1    
 
Nkt
1+'
(t)
 
1 + '
#
subject to the budget constraintZ 1
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and the usual transversality condition. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on infor-
mation available at time t,  is the discount factor (0 <  < 1) ; and  and ' are the inverses of the
intertemporal elasticities of habit-adjusted consumption and work (; ' > 0;  6= 1). The house-
holds period-t income includes: wage income from providing labor services to goods producing
rms, WtNkt , a lump sum transfer from the government, Zt, dividends from the monopolistically
competitive rms, t, and payments on the portfolio of assets, B
S;k
t and B
M;k
t . Taxes are levied
on the rmssales revenues which is equivalent to charging an income tax on all wage and prot
income. Households hold two forms of government bond. The rst is the familiar one period
debt, BSt , which has a price equal to the inverse of the gross nominal interest rate, P
S
t = R
 1
t .
The second type of bond is actually a portfolio of many bonds which, following Woodford (2001)
pay a declining premium of j , j periods after being issued where 0 <  <  1. The duration of
the bond, assuming stable prices is 11  , which means that  can be varied to capture changes in
the maturity structure of debt. By using this simple structure we need only price a single bond,
since any existing bond issued j periods ago is worth j new bonds. In the special case where
 = 1 these bonds become innitely lived consols.
There is an associated transversality condition derived as follows. Dene household wealth in
period t as,
Dkt = (1 + P
M
t )B
M;k
t 1 +B
S;k
t 1
the transversality condition can be written as,
lim
T !1EtRt;TD
k
T =PT  0
where Rt;T =
T 1Q
s=t
(
1+PMs+1
PMs
Ps
Ps+1
) for T  1 and Rt;t = 1 (see Eusepi and Preston (2010)).
We can then maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (4) to obtain the optimal
allocation of consumption across time, based on the pricing of one period bonds,
1 = Et
" 
Xkt+1t+1
Xkt t
! 
At
At+1
Pt
Pt+1
#
Rt;
and the geometrically declining payo¤ consols,
PMt = Et
" 
Xkt+1t+1
Xkt t
! 
At
At+1
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + PMt+1)
#
;
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Notice that when these reduce to single period bonds,  = 0, the price of these bonds is also given
by PMt = R
 1
t . However, outside of this special case the longer term bonds introduce the term
structure of interest rates to the model. It is convenient to dene the stochastic discount factor
for later use,
Qt;t+1 = 
 
Xkt+st+1
Xkt t
! 
At
At+1
Pt
Pt+1
; (5)
The second foc relates to their labour supply decision and is given by,

Wt
PtAt

= tN
k'
t X
k
t
where we have added an exogenous wage markup shock,
ln(t) = u ln(t 1) + "

t
which shall serve as a pure cost push shock to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). It
should be noted that variations in tax rates, either under scal rules or as part of an optimal
policy, will generate similar cost push e¤ects.
2.2 Firms
We further assume that intermediate goods producers are subject to the constraints of Calvo(1983)-
contracts such that, with xed probability (1  ) in each period, a rm can reset its price and
with probability  the rm retains the price of the previous period, but where, following Yun
(1996) that price is indexed to the steady-state rate of ination. When a rm can set the
price, it can either do so in order to maximize the present discounted value of (after-tax) prots,
Et
1X
s=0
sQt;t+sit+s, or it can follow a simple rule of thumb as in (Gali and Gertler (1999) or
Leith and Malley(2005)). The constraints facing the forward looking prot maximizers are the
demand for their own good (3) and the constraint that all demand be satised at the chosen
price. Prots are discounted by the s-step ahead stochastic discount factor Qt;t+s and by the
probability of not being able to set prices in future periods.
max
fPit; Yitg
Et
1X
s=0
sQt;t+s [((1   t+s)Pits  MCt+s)Yit+s]
s:t:Yit+s =

Pit
s
Pt+s
 
Yt+s
where Qt;t+s = s

Xt+1t+1
Xtt
  Pt
Pt+s
The relative price set by rms able to reset prices optimally in a forward-looking manner,
satises the following relationship:
P ft
Pt
=


   1
 Et 1X
s=0
()s
 
Xt+st+s
 
mct+s

Pt+s s
Pt

Yt+s
At+s
Et
1X
s=0
()s
 
Xt+st+s
 
(1   t+s)

Pt+s s
Pt
 1
Yt+s
At+s
(6)
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where mct = MCtPt is the real marginal cost and P
f
t denotes the price set by all rms who are able
to reset prices in period t and choose to do so in a prot maximizing way. Under exible prices
this implies, mct = (1   t) 1 .
However, in addition to the familiar Calvo-type price setters, we also allow for ination inertia.
To do so we assume that some rms follow simple rules of thumb when setting prices. Specically,
when a rm is given the opportunity of posting a new price, we assume that rather than posting
the prot maximizing price (6), a proportion of those rms, , follows a simple rule of thumb in
resetting that price:
P bt = P

t 1t 1; (7)
such that they update there price in line with last periods rate of ination rather than steady-
state ination, where P t 1 denotes an index of the reset prices given by
lnP t 1 = (1  ) lnP ft 1 + P bt 1: (8)
Pt represents the price level at time t. With  of rms keeping last periods price (but indexed
to steady-state ination) and (1  ) of rms setting a new price, the law of motion of this price
index is,
(Pt)
1  =  (Pt 1)1  + (1  ) (P t )1  :
Denoting the xed share of price-setters following the rule of thumb (7) by , we can derive a
price ination Phillips curve, as detailed in Leith and Malley (2005). For this we combine the rule
of thumb of price setters with the optimal price setting described above, leading to the Phillips
curve bt = fEtbt+1 + bbt 1 + c(cmct + 1   b t); (9)
where bt = ln(Pt)   ln(Pt 1)   ln() is the deviation of ination from its steady state value,cmct + 1  b t = ln(Wt=Pt)   lnAt + 1  b t   ln((   1)=) + ln(1   ), are log-linearised real
marginal costs adjusted for the impact of the sales revenue tax, and the reduced form parameter
convolutions are dened as f   , b   , c  (1 )(1 )(1 ) , with   (1+)+(1 ).
2.3 The Government
Combining the series of the representative consumers ow budget constraints, (4), and noting
the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
PtYt = PtCt + PtGt =WtNt +t +  tPtYt
we can (after assuming the aggregate stock of one period bonds is in zero net supply, BSt = 0)
rewrite the private sectors budget constraint as,
PMt B
M
t = (1 + P
M
t )B
M
t 1   PtYt t + PtGt + PtZt (10)
Distortionary taxation and spending adjustments are required to service government debt as
well as stabilize the economy. We can rewrite the federal government budget constraint in terms
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of debt to GDP ratio bMt =
PMt B
M
t
PtYt
,
bMt =
(1 + PMt )
PMt 1
Pt 1Yt 1
PtYt
bMt 1  
PtYt t
PtYt
+
PtGt
PtYt
+
PtZt
PtYt
(11)
where all scal variables are now expressed as a fraction of GDP.
2.4 The Complete Model
The complete system of non-linear equations describing the equilibrium are given in Appendix
1. Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (37) - (50) around the deterministic steady state
detailed in the Appendix, gives the following set of equations6:
 bXt + ' bNt = bwt   bt Labor Supply (12)bXt = Et bXt+1   1

 bRt   Etbt+1   Etbqt+1  bt + Etbt+1Euler equation (13)
bPMt =  bPMt+1   bRt Bond Prices (14)
byt = bNt = bct + 1
1  gegt Resource Constraint (15)bXt = (1  ) 1(bct   bct 1) Habits-Adjusted Consumption (16)
t = fEtt+1 + bt 1 + c( bwt + 11   e t) Hybrid NKPC (17)
ebMt = 1ebMt 1 + bM



bPMt   bPMt 1 + yt 1   yt   t   at (18)
 e t + egt + ezt Govt Budget Constraint
egt = gegt 1 + g(1  g)ebMt 1 + "gt Govt Spending (19)ezt = zt 1ezt 1 + "z;t Transfers Shock (20)bqt = zbqt 1 + "z;t Technology Shock (21)bt = bt 1 + "t Cost-Push Shock (22)bt = bt 1 + "t Preference Shock (23)
6The scal variables normalized with respect to GDP (i.e. ebMt ;e t , egt and ezt) are dened as the linear deviations
from their steady states, while other variables are expressed as the percentage deviations from their steady states.
Prior to linearization, output, consumption and real wages are all rendered stationary by scaling by technology, At.
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where f   , b   , c  (1 )(1 )(1 ) , and   (1 + ) + (1  ). The model is then
closed through the addition of one of the descriptions of policy considered in Section 3. While
the associated microfouned objective function is shown in Appendix 3 to be,
 0 =  1
2
N
1+'
E0
1X
t=0
t
8<:
(1 )
1 
c
y
 bXt + bt2 + 'byt   'bt2
+ (1 )(1 )

2t +
 1
(1 ) [t   t 1]2

9=;+ tip+O[2] (24)
3 Policy Making
We consider two descriptions of policy making. Firstly, where both monetary and scal policy
follow simple rules, before allowing the monetary and scal authorities to behave optimally but
independently.
3.1 Rules-Based Policy
When considering policy described by simple rules, we assume government spending follows a
simple exogenous autoregressive process,
egt = gegt 1 + "gt (25)
and tax policy follows a simple rule,
e t = ;ie t 1 + (1  ;i);iebMt 1 + ybyt+ "t (26)
with i = AM=PF;AM=AF;PM=PF; PM=PF
where the coe¢ cient on debt switches between ;i = 0 in the active scal policy regime (AF),
and ;i > 0 in the passive scal policy regime (PF), and we also allow the persistence of the tax
rate, ;i to vary across scal regimes. Moreover, we allow the parameters to vary depending on
which monetary policy regime the scal policy regime is paired with. Therefore, a passive scal
policy operating alongside an active monetary policy may have a di¤erent coe¢ cient on debt
;AM=PF > 0 than when it is paired with a passive monetary policy, ;PM=PF > 0
When US monetary policy is described as a generalized Taylor rule, we specify this rule
following An and Schorfheide (2007),
Rt = 
R;jRt 1 + (1  R;j)[ 1;jbt +  2;j(byt + bqt)] + "Rt (27)
with j = AM=PF;AM=AF;PM=PF; PM=PF
where the Fed adjusts interest rates in response to movements in ination and deviations of output
growth from trend. We allow the rule parameters (R;j ;  1;j ;  2;j ; ) to switch between active and
passive monetary policy regimes. An active monetary policy regime (AM) is characterized by
 1;i > 1; while the passive monetary policy regime (PM) is characterized by 0 <  1;i < 1. Again
these parameters may vary depending on which scal regime the monetary policy regime is paired
with.
9
By considering both scal and monetary policy changes, we can distinguish four policy regimes
under rules-based policy. They are AM/PF, AM/AF, PM/PF and PM/AF. Leeper(1991) shows
that, in the absence of regime switching, the existence of a unique solution to the model depends on
the nature of the assumed policy regime. A unique solution can be found under both the AM/PF
and PM/AF combinations of regime - in the former monetary policy actively targets ination,
while scal policy adjusts taxes to stabilize debt, while under the latter combination the scal
authority does not adjust taxes to stabilize debt and the monetary authority does not actively
target ination in order to facilitate the stabilization of debt. In contrast, no stationary solution
and multiple equilibria are obtained under the AM/AF and PM/AF combinations of regimes,
respectively. However, when regime switching is considered, the existence and uniqueness of a
solution also depends on the transition probabilities of the potential regime changes. Specically,
we allow monetary and scal policy rule parameters to be switched independently of each other.
The transition matrices for monetary policy and scal policy are specied as follows:
PM =

p11 1  p22
1  p11 p22

; (28)
QF =

q11 1  q22
1  q11 q22

(29)
In addition, as noted above, we allow for variations in the parameter values of active and
passive monetary and scal rules if this is supported by the data. Indeed, we nd signicant
variations in the AM and PF regimes depending on which policy they are combined with.
In addition to incorporating monetary and scal policy changes, we also account for the good
luckfactor that is normally modelled as a decrease in the volatility of shocks hitting the economy.
Therefore, we allow for independent regime switching in the variance of economics shocks. These
include technology (bqt), preference (bt) and cost-push (bt) shocks. We assume the following
transition matrix for the shock processes:
H =

h11 1  h22
1  h11 h22

; (30)
We adopt the solution algorithm proposed by Farmer et al (2011) to solve the model with
Markov-switching in policy rule parameters. This model can be recast in the following system
 0(S
j
t = i)Xt =  1(S
j
t = i)Xt 1 +	(S
j
t = i)Zt +(S
j
t = i)t: (31)
In contrast to the standard representation of a linear model with time-invariant policy rules,
 0; 1;	 and  in (31) depend on unobserved state variables, S
j
t = i; where j = M;F for
monetary and scal policy, and i = P;A for passive and active regimes. When a solution exists,
it can be rewritten as the following AR(1) process
Xt = 1(S
j
t = i)Xt 1 +2(S
j
t = i)Zt; Zt  NID(0;): (32)
It is important to note that the law of motion of state variables not only depends on the pa-
rameters of a particular regime, but also the probability of moving across regimes. The spillover
from one regime to another reects the fact that economic agents are assumed to anticipate the
Markov switching between di¤erent policy rules. Equation (32) can be linked to the system of
measurement equations in Section 4 for estimation.
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3.2 Optimal Policy
We now turn to describe our optimal policy specications. In Chen et al (2013, 2014) we estimate
monetary policy models of the US and Euro-area respectively and nd that monetary policy is
best described as being optimal, but time-consistent i.e. operating under discretion rather than
commitment. This dominates both a rule-based description of monetary policy and the time-
inconsistent Ramsey policy. In extending this analysis to scal policy there are several additional
factors to contend with. Firstly, the monetary and scal authorities should be considered to be
independent policy makers with potentially di¤erent policy objectives. This, in turn, implies that
we must consider the strategic interactions between the two policy makers where we allow them to
play a game where either can be considered to be the Stackelberg leader (making policy decisions
anticipating the reaction of the other) or a Nash equilibrium where each policy maker takes the
others policies as given in formulating their own policies. Secondly, while Chen et al (2013, 2014)
nd strong evidence that monetary policy has been conducted optimally, albeit with switches in
the degree of conservatism over time, it is not obvious that scal policy can be considered to have
been similarly optimal. Therefore, while we permit monetary policy to be conducted optimally,
with switches in the degree of conservatism, we allow scal policy to switch between rule-based
and optimal time-consistent policy.
In implementing optimal policy we need to describe policy objectives. In doing so, estimation
with micro-founded weights is problematic. Since the micro-founded weights are functions of
structural parameters, they place very tight cross-equation restrictions on the model which are
generally thought to be implausible. In particular, for standard estimates of the degree of price
stickiness, the micro-founded weight attached to ination can be over 100 times that attached to
the output terms (see Woodford (2003, Chapter 6). Optimal policies which were based on such
a strong anti-ination objective would clearly be inconsistent with observed ination volatility.
Therefore, for estimation, we adopt a form of the objective function for each policy maker which
is consistent with the representative agentsutility, (equation 24) but allow the weights within
that objective function to be freely estimated. The resulting objective function for the monetary
authority is given by
 m0 =  
1
2
N
1+'
E0
1X
t=0
t
8>><>>:
!

2t +
 1
(1 ) [t   t 1]2

+!1
 bXt + bt2 + !2 byt   'bt2
+!R(Rt)
2
9>>=>>;+ tip+O[2] (33)
where the weight on ination, !; is normalized to 1 in the conservative regime and ! < 1
in the less conservative regime and we have allowed for a possible desire to smooth the policy
instrument.
Similarly, the objective function for the scal authority is given by,
 f0 =  
1
2
N
1+'
E0
1X
t=0
t
8>><>>:
!f

2t +
 1
(1 ) [t   t 1]2

+!1
 bXt + bt2 + !2 byt   'bt2
+! ( t)
2
9>>=>>;+ tip+O[2] (34)
where the objective functions di¤er in the weight attached to ination, and the presence of an
instrument smoothing objective which is specic to that policy maker. In allowing for the weight
11
of ination to di¤er across the two policy makers we are essentially allowing the government to
appoint a conservative central banker as in Rogo¤ (1985), as well as allowing the degree of mone-
tary policy conservatism to vary over time. Given this interpretation, we consider the scal policy
makers objective function (excluding the instrument smoothing term) to be a measure of social
welfare when evaluating and constructing various counterfactual exercises below.7 Otherwise the
objective functions are the same and have the same form as the micro-founded welfare measure.
This has the advantage of facilitating comparison across policy makers, as well as with micro-
founded optimal policy studies while still retaining su¢ cient exibility to enable us to explain
the data.
When considering the case where the scal authority may uctuate between optimal and
rules-based policy, we generalize the scal authoritys objective function as follows

f = (1  p   a) f0 + p( t   pt )2 + a( t   at )2 (35)
where p = 1 (a = 1) indicates we are in a regime where scal policy follows a passive (active)
rule, and these indicators are zero otherwise. The setting of the policy instrument consistent with
the passive (active) rule is given by equation (26).Therefore, we allow for switches in preferences
which imply the policy maker may conduct policy optimally, or switch to a policy objective which
implies their only goal is to implement an active or passive scal rule.
As with the rules-based policy, we again assume that monetary and scal policy switch inde-
pendently of each other. When we allow scal policy to switch across optimal scal (OF), PF
and AF regimes, the transition matrix of scal policy is modied as follows:
QF =
24 q11 1  q22   q23 q13q12 q22 1  q13   q33
1  q11   q12 q23 q33
35 (36)
To solve the optimal policy problem outlined above, we propose a new algorithm, described in
Appendices 4 and 5, with two policy makers under di¤erent structures of strategic interaction (i.e.
when one policy maker can be considered a Stackelberg leader in the policy game and when they
move simultaneously as part of a Nash equilibrium). Our algorithm incorporates potential changes
in policy makerspreferences over time. We consider di¤erent forms of strategic interaction by
allowing either policy maker to be considered the Stackelberg leader in the game or the Nash
equilibrium.8 Our estimation indicated that the case of scal policy leadership is preferred by the
data over the other forms of the game. Therefore, we focus on the case of the scal leadership
and consider alternative models with variations in how scal policy switches. By comparing the
marginal data density presented in Table 1, we conclude that the model that incorporates three
scal policy regimes: OF, PF and AF provides the best t to the data.
It should be noted that while we allow the monetary and scal policy makers to play strategic
games with each other, we do not assume any strategic interactions with their future selves.
7We can have a degree of condence in this interpretation in that the estimated conservative monetary policy
objective function is not dissimilar to that which would have been optimally chosen for a central bank by a
government with such social preferences.
8This extends the analysis of Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010) who consider strategic interactions between policy
makers when estimating simple models for the US, UK and Sweden, as they do not allow for switches in policy
regime.
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Therefore, for example, the scal policy maker today does not try to tie the hands of her future
self when conducting policy today. Instead the switches in the objective function can be considered
to be part of the evolution of policy maker preferences as each type of policy maker cooperates
with their future selves. Particularly in the case of scal policy, this kind of strategic interaction
over time would be an interesting area for future research.
The next section will discuss our estimation results. However, before doing so it is important
to note that all model parameters are identiable. To demonstrate this, we used the Iskrev
(2010) local identication test for our models based on a simple rule as well as optimal policy
under discretion.
4 Estimation
Our empirical analysis uses six US data series on real output growth (GDPt), annualized domes-
tic ination (INFt), the federal funds rate (FFRt), the annualized debt-to-GDP ratio (Bt=GDPt),
government spending to GDP ratio (Gt=GDPt) and federal tax revenues to GDP ratio (Tt=GDPt)
from 1955Q1 to 2008Q3. All data are seasonally adjusted and at quarterly frequencies. Output
growth is the log di¤erence of real GDP, multiplied by 100. Ination is the log di¤erence of GDP
deator, scaled by 400. The three scal variables - debt, government spending and taxes - are
normalized with respect to GDP and multiplied by 100. GDP, the GDP deator, government
spending and total tax revenues are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Government
debt is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Finally, the federal funds rate is taken
from the FRED database. Appendix 6 describes the dataset in detail.
The data are linked to the law of motion of states solved under rules-based and optimal policy
through a measurement equation specied as:26666664
GDPt
INFt
FFRt
Gt=GDPt
Tt=GDPt
Bt=GDPt
37777775 =
266666664
Q +byt + bqt
A + 4bt
rA + A + 4Q + 4 bRt
100g + egt
100 + e t
100
4 b
M + 14
ebMt
377777775
;
where parameters, Q; A, rA; g;  and bM represent the steady-state values of output growth,
ination, real interest rates, government spending to GDP ratio, tax rate and debt-to-GDP at
quarterly basis.
For both rules-based and optimal policy estimation, we x the steady-state values of scal
variables and output growth to be consistent with the sample mean values over the period of
1955Q1 - 2008Q3. The government spending to GDP ratio (g) is 8%. The federal tax revenues to
GDP ratio () is 17.5%. The federal debt to annualized output ratio (bM ) is 31%. The quarterly
output growth (Q) is 0.46%. We further assume that the steady-state of real interest rate (rA)
is 1.8% given a 2% ination target (A). The average real interest rate, rA, is linked to the
discount factor, ; such that  =
 
1 + rA=400
 1
: In addition, we xed the average maturity of
outstanding government debt at 5 years (see Leeper and Zhou (2013), Table 1).
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Due to the presence of Markov-switching parameters, the likelihood function is approximated
using Kim(1994)s lter, and then combined with the prior distribution to obtain the posterior
distribution. A random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is then used to generate 1,500,000
draws from the posterior distribution with the rst 500,000 draws being discarded and every 50th
draw from the remaining draws being saved.9
Finally, we compute the log marginal likelihood values for each model to provide a coherent
framework to compare models with di¤erent types of monetary policies. We rst implement the
commonly used modied harmonic mean estimator of Geweke(1999) for this task. Bayes factors
are calculated based on these values. In addition, we utilize the approach of Sims et al (2008)
as a robustness check. The latter is designed for models with time-varying parameters, where
the posterior density may be non-Gaussian. The log marginal likelihood values are presented in
Table 1, where the optimal policy model with three scal policy regimes (i.e. OF, PF and AF)
provides the best t to the data, whereas the rules-based policy produces signicantly worse t
to the data compared to all optimal policy models.10
4.1 Prior Distributions
Table 2 presents the priors and posterior estimates for the rules-based policy. The priors for
most of the parameters are relatively loose and broadly consistent with the literature on the
estimation of New Keynesian models. Following Smets and Wouters (2003), we choose the normal
distribution for inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, '; and the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, ; with both priors having a mean of 2.5. Habits formation, indexation
and the AR(1) parameters of the technology, cost-push, taste and transfer shocks and government
spending process are assumed to follow a beta distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.15. It is important to note that the above priors are common to both the rule-based
and optimal policies. The exception is the Calvo parameter where the probability of no price
change, , is set so that the average length of the contract is around one year with a fairly tight
prior around that value. Allowing a looser prior on this parameter tends to result in implausibly
high estimates of the degree of price stickiness.
For the interest rate rule parameters, we set symmetric priors for the AR(1) parameter of
the lagged interest rate and the parameter of output growth, whereas asymmetric and truncated
priors are used for the parameter of ination to ensure that  1 > 1 in the active monetary policy
regime and 0 <  1 < 1 in the passive regime. Similarly, for the tax rule, a symmetric prior is
used for the AR(1) parameter of lagged tax rate, while the parameter of debt is restricted to be
zero in the active scal regime and positive in the passive scal regime. Overall, the priors of the
policy rule parameters imply four distinct scal and monetary policy regimes: PF/AM, AF/AM,
PF/PM and AF/PM. In addition, variances of shocks are chosen to be highly dispersed inverted
Gamma distributions to generate realistic volatilities for the endogenous variables. To capture
the good luck factor, we specically allow for the standard deviations of the three economic shocks
9Geweke(1992) convergence diagnostics are available upon request.
10Following Je¤reys(2007), Kass and Raftery(1995) argue that values of the Bayes Factor associated with two
models lying between 0 and 3.2 constitutes evidence which is "not worth more than a bare mention", between 3.2
and 10 is substantialevidence, between 10 and 100 is strongevidence and above 100 is decisiveevidence.
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(i.e. the technology, preference and cost-push shocks) in the model to subject to regime switching
between high and low volatility regimes. The priors for shock variances are set to be symmetric
across regimes.
Table 3 reports the priors and posterior parameter estimates for optimal policy, the relative
weights (i.e. !1; !2 and !R ) attached to the output and interest rate smoothing terms on
the monetary policy objective function are assumed to follow beta distributions. In addition,
asymmetric prior is chosen for the weight attached to ination stabilization term (!), where !
is restricted to 1 in the conservative ination targeting regime and a value lower than 1, a beta
distribution, is used for the less conservative regime. For the scal policy objective function, we
restrict the relative weights attached to the output terms to be the same as these on the monetary
policy preferences, while we estimate the weight on the ination stabilization term (!f) placed
by the scal authority. We assume that !f follows a Gamma distribution with prior mean of 1.
This implies that the scal authority has a consistent preference in terms of ination targeting
with the monetary policy authority in the conservative ination targeting regime. Furthermore,
instead of stabilizing interest rates, we assume that the scal authority is concerned with the
variation of tax rates. Therefore, we add a tax rate smoothing term to the scal policy objective
function.
4.2 Posterior Estimates
4.2.1 Rules-Based Policy
The posterior parameter estimates of the rules-based policy are reported in Table 2. Our estimates
of the structural model papers are broadly in line with other studies: an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, , of 2.6; a measure of price stickiness,  = 0:78, implying that price contracts
typically last for around one year; a relatively modest degree of price indexation,  = 0:21, a
signicant estimate of the degree of habits,  = 0:61 and an inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity
of ' = 2:4.
Under the rules-based policy, we have four alternative policy permutations: AM/PF, AM/AF,
PM/PF and PM/AF. As discussed above, in order to allow for maximum exibility in describing
the policy regimes, we initially allow for variations in the parameters of active and passive mon-
etary and scal rules across the four policy regimes. In other words, the active monetary (AM)
rule parameters in the AM/PF regime can di¤er from these in the AM/AF regimes. Indeed,
we nd signicant variations in the AM and PF regimes depending on which policy they are
combined with. However, the PM and AF regimes appeared to be similar regardless of which
policy they were paired with. Therefore, we restrict PM and AF to be the same across their
respective paired regimes. The resultant policy regimes imply that the passive monetary policy is
inertial, R = 0:85 only falling slightly short of the Taylor principle  1 = 0:80 with a signicant
coe¢ cient on output,  2 = 0:35. While an active monetary policy paired with a passive scal
policy is both inertial R = 0:85 and very aggressive in targeting ination,  1 = 2:90 with a
relatively modest response to output,  2 = 0:36. When scal policy is active, then an associated
active monetary policy is far less aggressive as interest rate inertia falls, R = 0:53 along with the
response to ination,  1 = 1:33, while the response to output increases,  2 = 0:44. Since this
latter regime is inherently unstable, it would appear that the conict between the monetary and
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scal authority results in a moderation in the conservatism of monetary policy even while that
policy remains active. Similarly, the passive scal policy is far more inertial  = 0:91 and less
responsive to debt,  = 0:03 when it is paired with an active monetary policy than when the
passive scal policy is paired with a passive monetary policy where tax rate inertia falls,  = 0:42
and the response to debt rises,  = 0:08. These kinds of di¤erences in estimation across regimes
could reect the nature of the conict between monetary and scal policy. In the case of the
AM/AF regime the policy is unstable and only rendered determinate because of spillovers from
other policy permutations, so that the moderation in monetary policy would serve to mitigate
the unstable debt dynamics caused by rising debt service costs under the active monetary policy.
Similarly, a passive scal policy which raises distortionary taxes to stabilize debt is likely to fuel
ination and lead to rising debt service costs when monetary policy is active. This is less of a
danger when monetary policy is passive, so that scal policy can be relatively more aggressive in
responding to debt in the latter case. These results suggest that the stance of one policy maker is
dependent on the policies of the other. We now turn to analyze this more formally by considering
optimal policy where one policy maker takes into account the actions of the other.
4.2.2 Optimal Strategic Policy
Table 3 presents the posterior parameter estimates for the optimal policy where the monetary
policy authority conducts an optimal policy taking the policies of the scal authority as given, and
where we allow that monetary authoritys objective function to switch in its degree of conservatism
over time. At the same time the scal authority acts as a Stackelberg leader in the game with the
monetary authority so that the scal authority conducts policy anticipating the response of the
Fed. Fiscal policy may switch between this leadership role and conducting policy through simple
active/passive rules. Under the optimal policy model, monetary policy is always assumed to be
optimal, but time-consistent with the weight attached to ination stabilization, !; estimated
to be 0:442 in the less conservative (LC) ination targeting regime, relative to 1 in the more
conservative (MC) regime. In addition, when the scal authority acts as a Stackelberg leader, she
appears to have a lower degree of ination conservatism than that of monetary policy authority,
with !f estimated to be 0:335: The scal authority also implements simple active/passive tax
rules. Both active and passive scal rules appear to be persistent and under the latter, the
response of taxes to debt is  = 0:05. In total, six policy regimes are identied, three for scal
policy (i.e. OF, PF and AF) and two for monetary policy (i.e. MC and LC).
The estimates of the deep model parameters remain similar to those found under rules-based
policy with a modest rise in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to  = 2:945 and indexa-
tion,  = 0:21, but a slight fall in the degree of habits,  = 0:51. The other signicant di¤erence
is that the estimated degree of persistence of cost-push rises dramatically as we move from the
rules-based estimation to the optimal policy estimation, rising from  = 0:28 to  = 0:95. This
reects the fact that costs push shocks generate the greatest trade-o¤ for policy makers as they
raise ination and reduce output and thereby are relied on heavily by the estimation when policy
is assumed to be optimal.
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4.3 Regime Switching
4.3.1 Rules-Based Policy
Bianchi (2012) considers three regimes with a circular transition matrix such that one passes from
the goodregime of AM/PF to the badregime of PM/AF before passing through the unstable
regime of AM/AF to the AM/PF regime again. Therefore, we are in the goodregime in the
early part of the sample before transition to the PM/AF regime in the 1960s. The appointment
of Volcker in 1979 leads to monetary policy turning active while scal policy remains active, until
the early 1990s when we arrive at the good regime (AM/PF). Thinking of the transitions as
reecting a game of chicken between the monetary and scal authorities this set-up prevents the
policy combination of PM/PF, it also prevents the direct transition from AM/PF to AM/AF
as would be the case when scal policy turned badwhile monetary policy still clung to active
ination targeting.
Bianchi and Ilut (2015) use a di¤erent transition scheme allowing transitions between good
and bad regimes through AM/AF in either direction where a small prior is attached to remaining
in the unstable regime. Here we are in the PM/AF regime from the late 1960s to the Volcker
disination. There are two brief attempts at disination in 1969 and 1973, both fail. Only
the Volcker disination sticks with a brief period of the unstable regime AM/AF and a slight
monetary policy wobble in between. Afterwards it is the goodregime all the way from the early
1980s onwards.
In both cases, the narrative is one of a switch from a passive to an active monetary policy
around the time of Volcker with scal policy following suit by switching from an active to passive
regime sometime later (in the early 1990s in Bianchi (2012) and early 1980s in Bianchi and Ilut
(2015)).
Our assumption on policy regime transitions are less restrictive, and thus give a more nuanced
picture of transitions between regimes - see Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 details the movements across
scal policy regimes, where the rst panel describes the probability of being in the passive scal
policy regime and the second the active scal policy regime. The third panel gives the probability
of being in the active monetary policy regime (with its complement being the passive monetary
regime). In Figure 3, we plot the estimated probabilities of being in the goodregime of AM/PF,
the badregime of PM/AF and the regimes which imply conict between monetary and scal
policy (PM/PF and AM/AF). We are in the goodregime right up until the late 1960s. Then
scal policy turns active in 1969, and monetary policy turns passive shortly afterwards. There is
a brief attempt at disination in 1973, but we essentially stay in the PM/AF regime until Volcker.
Afterwards monetary policy stays active, and there are brief irtations with passive scal policy
around 1980 and 1987, although none stick until 1992. The aftermath of the bursting of the dot
com bubble around 2001 is associated with a relaxation of monetary policy (PM) while scal
policy remains passive. This is not a regime which is possible under either Bianchi (2012) or
Bianchi and Ilut(2015). Therefore, under our rules-based estimation the 1960s are not nearly as
bad as these papers nd and the conventional policy assignment did not re-emerge until 1992 and
even then has not been uninterrupted since then.
Although much of the analysis of monetary and scal interactions focuses on the active/passive
regimes rst characterized by Leeper (1991), our estimates suggest that regimes that are only
determinate because of the expectations of returning to either the AM/PF or PM/AF regime
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actually describe observed policy congurations for much of our sample period. Figure 3 plots
the likelihood of being in the goodregime (AM/PF), the badregime (PM/AF) and being in
a state of conict when policy is described by simple rules. While the bad regime is almost
entirely focused in the 1970s, conict is recurrent from the 1970s onwards such that 63% of the
period is spent in the good regime, only 13% in the bad and 24% in conict.
Another way of looking at this is to consider monetary and scal policy in isolation. Monetary
policy was only passive in the 1970s (with an attempted disination in 1973) and following the
dot-com crash. Fiscal policy was only passive prior to the 1970s and after the 1990s, although
with brief periods of passivity in the 1980s.
4.3.2 Optimal Strategic Policy
When we turn to the case where we allow monetary policy to be optimal and to uctuate between
more and less conservative (MC and LC, respectively), while scal policy can move between OF,
PF and AF, the results are even richer - see Figures 4 and 5. Looking at monetary policy alone the
periods of less conservative monetary policy capture all those identied as passive in the rule-based
estimation (the 1970s and following the dot-com crash). However, there are additional periods
where monetary policy are identied as less conservative. The late 1950s gave way to uctuations
in conservatism throughout the rst half of the 1960s, which then turned less conservative from
1967 until 1982, with only a brief bout of conservatism in 1976/7. As in Chen et al (2013) the
Volcker disination didnt really take hold until 1982. From 1982 onwards, the more conservative
regime becomes the dominant regime, with monetary policy occasionally shifting back to the
less conservative regime. These include the periods after stock market crash of 1987, a boom
period from 1997-1999 when the Fed chose not to tighten interest rates possibly in response to
the Russian sovereign debt default of 1998 and the associated collapse of Long Term Capital
Management, and after the dot com crash when the historically low federal funds rate resulted
in a negative real interest rate from 2003-2005. Therefore, the sense that the Volcker disination
was a decisive shift to a more conservative monetary policy is less clear than under rules-based
estimates.
While scal policy is clearer. It was either passive or optimal until the late 1960s, where it
turns predominantly active. The instances of non-active scal policy are associated with specic
policy events. For example, the Nixon tax reforms of 1970 appear as an example of a passive
policy, which then turned optimalas scal policy was loosened prior to the 1972 election Here
the policy was optimal in the sense that reducing tax revenues as a share of GDP reduced
the inationary impact of distortionary taxation at a time when ination was rising sharply.
Similarly, the tax rebate of President Ford in 1975 appears as a passive scal policy as the debt
to GDP ratio has fallen below the steady state value targeted in the passive rule. It only becomes
passive/optimal for a sustained period in 1994, but loses that status around 2000 for a couple
of years as rising tax revenues amount to too aggressive a stabilization of debt to constitute an
optimal policy. Following Clinton, the Bush tax cuts then imply a return to an active scal policy
which then is then estimated to turn passive as the pre-2007 boom generates rising tax revenues
relative to GDP despite the tax cuts. This particular boom is also associated with a relaxation
in US Fed policy. The benign picture of scal policy turning passive in support of a conservative
monetary policy shortly after the Volcker disination does not appear under the optimal policy
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model estimation. Instead it is really only with the Clinton administration that scal policy turns
optimal/passive for any length of time in the recent past, while neither monetary nor scal policy
appear to have permanently shifted to conservative and passive/optimal regimes, respectively.
Looking at the permutations of monetary and scal policy together we nd that scal policy
was initially optimal in the late 1950s before being best described by a passive rule, while monetary
policy uctuated between more or less conservative policies throughout the period to the 1970s.
In the 1970s monetary policy becomes less conservative (aside from a brief bout of conservatism
in 1976), while scal policy initially wavers between passivity/optimality and activism in the late
1960s, early 1970s before becoming solidly active until 1994. Therefore the Volcker disination
doesnt show up as an increase in conservatism until 1982 and this is not associated with a
supportive scal policy until the Clinton administration in 1994. Even then there is a passive
monetary policy post 1997 until 1999 and from 2002/3 where the latter occurred at the same
time as an active scal policy.
When we turn to the optimal policy estimations for comparison with the rules-based estima-
tion we consider the combination of less (more) conservative monetary policy and passive/optimal
(active) scal policy to represent conict; optimal or passive scal policy combined with more
conservative monetary policy to capture goodpolicy; and, active scal policy and less conserva-
tive monetary policy to indicate badpolicy. With these denitions 36% of the sample is spent in
goodpolicy regime, 27% in the badregime, whereas the largest share of time involves conict
between monetary and scal policy. We can ask, to what extent does eliminating conict improve
outcomes? Is it better to avoid conict or avoid the badregime? This is an issue to which we
now turn.
4.4 Credibility and Conict
In order to facilitate an understanding of the implications of being in the di¤erent permutations
of the policy regimes we consider the following impulse response. We assume that the various
endogenous states of the model are set to their observed value at the start of the sample period.
This implies that the debt to GDP ratio is well above average as is government spending, while
taxes are relatively low. At the same time, output is above trend, while ination and interest
rates are below average. We then consider how the economy would have evolved under the
various possible regimes without being subject to any further shocks, although assuming that
the estimated regime switches could still take place. How is debt stabilized from this high initial
state under each of the regimes? Figure 6 plots gures of debt, ination, the output gap, taxes
and interest rates. The rst column considers the estimated passive scal rule combined with
either the more or less time-consistent monetary policy. As would be expected the passive scal
rule succeeds in stabilizing debt, although slowly (it takes ve years for the debt to GDP ratio
to begin falling) given the inertia in government consumption and tax rates. The rising tax rates
fuel ination however, and the combination of a conservative monetary policy and passive scal
policy is actually very inationary.
Column 2 of Figure 6 then considers the active scal policy regime combined with the more
or less conservative monetary policy. Either of these regimes fails to begin to stabilize debt
within 10 years and ination rises as debt levels rise. Column 3 then allows scal policy to act
as a Stackelberg leader, while monetary policy follows with more or less conservative objectives.
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Surprisingly, this regime also fails to stabilize debt, although ination is moderated by the scal
authority moderating the increases in taxes relative to those implemented under the passive scal
rule. We shall explore why the optimal scal policy regime fails to stabilize debt immediately
below. The nal column considers the outcomes when policy acts cooperatively according to
either commitment (time-inconsistent policy) or discretion (time-consistent). Here we can see
the di¤erences between commitment and discretion highlighted by Leeper and Leith (2015) as
the Ramsey/commitment policy adjusts policy to very slowly stabilize debt without generating
ination. In contrast, the time-consistent cooperative policy implies a signicant endogenous
inationary bias whenever debt is above its steady-state value which results in a massive increase
in ination and the desire to reduce debt back to the steady state as quickly as possible.
We now turn to re-consider the surprising result that optimal scal policy failed to decisively
stabilize debt. To do so we replicate the IRF of Figure 6 in Figure 7, but now assume that each
regime is fully credible - that is economic agents no longer expect to transition from that regime
to any of the other possible regimes. Turning immediately to column 3 we see that the optimal
scal policy now successfully stabilizes debt. It was therefore spillovers from the other regimes
that resulted in the optimal policy failing to do so when transition to these regimes was still a
possibility. To see which regime mattered, we can return to column 1 and consider the passive
scal policy. When this regime is fully credible, the tax adjustment is highly inationary and
the extent to which monetary policy moderates that ination depends on how conservative the
monetary authoritys objectives are - towards the end of the IRF plot ination is highest under
the combination of less conservative monetary policy and passive scal policy. Moreover, this
level of ination is higher than when this policy combination was not fully credible. When we
consider the active scal policy debt remains unstabilized within 10 years even when the regime
is fully credible and the path for ination is strongly contingent on the conservatism of monetary
policy, although the average level of ination is not much changed relative to the case where the
same regime lacked credibility. It is therefore the less conservative monetary policy/passive scal
policy regime that results in spillovers to the optimal scal policy regime which prevent it from
stabilizing debt. The optimal policy for the scal authority takes account of the higher taxes
and therefore ination that would emerge if policy switched to the passive scal rule. These
alternative policies raise ination expectations and result in the optimal scal authority cutting
taxes today to o¤set the inationary impact of expectations of moving to the high tax passive
scal policy regime. This moderation of taxes raises debt going into the next period, and further
worsens the ination generated by a switch to the passive regime so that the scal authority
further moderates tax increases to o¤set this e¤ect. When there is no expectation of moving
to the passive regime, the optimal scal policy is far more e¤ective in stabilizing debt without
generating ination.11
The nal IRF we consider follows the same format - see Figure 8 - but assumes that we elimi-
nate the possibility that policy will be in conict. Therefore, in the case of scal accommodation
scal policy adjusts such that it becomes passive whenever monetary policy is conservative and
active whenever monetary policy is less conservative. And the converse where monetary policy
11We can see this more formally by decomposing the extent to which inationary expectations are driven by
expected switches to the various regimes. This makes clear that raised inationary expectations under the optimal
scal policy regime are being driven by the expectation of switching to the passive scal policy rule. These results
are available upon request.
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adjusts to accommodate switches in scal policy so that a less (more) conservative monetary
policy supports an active (passive/optimal) scal policy regime. Removing conictual regimes
does tend to reduce ination across all the remaining regimes, particularly when scal policy
is active. This is also associated with a lower rate of taxation, particular when scal policy is
optimal. However, it remains the case that scal leadership even when associated with a con-
servative monetary policy has failed to begin the reduce the debt to GDP ratio within 10 years
as the policy maker is still ghting against the expectations of higher taxes/ination should the
regime switch to the active tax rule, even although such a rule will always be associated with a
conservative monetary policy.
4.5 Shocks
In Figure 9 we assess the extent to which the major trends in debt and ination are driven by
shifts in policy regime relative to shocks. The third column plots the estimated shock processes
from our preferred model. While columns one and two plot the outcomes for the debt to GDP
ratio and ination, respectively under three scenarios. Firstly, with all estimated shocks and
regime probabilities that replicate the data. Secondly, without any realized shocks, but assuming
the estimated regime switches still take place, and thirdly the same scenario but with only one
of the possible realized shocks. From this exercise we can see that a large part of the early fall in
the debt to GDP ratio is due to the below average level of transfers estimated to be in place prior
to the 1970s. Without this relatively low level of transfers ination would have risen in the 1960s
rather than 1970s. Later in the sample, the stabilization of debt in the 1990s was achievable
because of the o¤setting reduction in government consumption at a time of rising transfers. As
might be expected, cost push shocks are needed to explain the spikes in ination in the 1970s,
but contribute surprisingly little to explaining ination dynamics otherwise. Since transfers were
not treated as being observable in the estimation it is interesting to assess to what extent our
estimated transfers series matches the data. We add the data series to the relevant plot in the
third column and we can see that the estimated series is a very close approximation to the actual
series. From this we can conclude that our model is not utilizing improbable unobserved shock
processes to explain the major developments in the debt to GDP ratio and ination.
5 Welfare and Counterfactuals
In Table 4 we report the unconditional volatilities of key variables as well as the implied welfare
cost of shocks under various policy regimes. The measure of welfare is the estimated objective
function for the scal authority (excluding the instrument smoothing term) which we take to be
a measure of social welfare. As discussed above we feel this is a natural measure of social welfare
rather than the estimated objective function for the monetary authority since we assume that the
government employs a conservativecentral banker as in Rogo¤ (1985) to optimize the outcomes
under discretion. This implies that the optimized degree of ination conservatism that would be
chosen by the government is greater than the governments underlying preference for ination
stabilization. When we compute the optimal degree of ination aversion for a delegated central
bank we nd that it is remarkably similar to that estimated for the monetary authority under the
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more conservative regime.12 Throughout this table we assume that the regime remains in place
indenitely, but economic agents anticipate the probability of moving to the other policy regimes.
In this sense we can think of these particular policy regimes has not possessing full credibility.
The results are presented in order of welfare cost, from low to high. The ranking of policy regimes
is similar across low and high shock volatility regimes. The preferred policy is a passive scal
policy, combined with a less conservative optimal monetary policy. However, this is almost indis-
tinguishable in welfare terms from a policy in which monetary policy accommodates scal policy
regime switches (regime MA). In this latter regime scal policy uctuates between passive/active
rules and optimal policy according to the estimated transition probabilities. However, whenever
it does so we assume that monetary policy switches too in an accommodating manner such that
an active scal policy is always combined with a less conservative optimal monetary policy, and
a passive/optimal scal policy is combined with a more conservative optimal monetary policy. In
other words we assume that monetary policy adjusts to switches in scal policy in order to avoid
conicts between the two policies. The next two preferred policies are ones which combine a
passive scal policy with a more conservative monetary policy, closely followed by a policy where
scal policy adjusts to accommodate switches in monetary policy so that an active monetary
policy is always supported by a passive scal policy and a passive monetary policy implies a
move to an active scal policy. These four permutations are relatively close in welfare terms.
The remaining four policy combinations are far less successful. Surprisingly these less success-
ful policies include the combination of optimal monetary policy with optimal scal policy where
the latter acts as a Stackelberg leader anticipating the reaction of the former, and the combina-
tion of an optimal scal policy with a less conservative monetary policy is even worse than the
conventional badpolicy combination of an active scal policy with a more or less conservative
monetary policy across both high and low volatility regimes. Why does the optimal scal policy
perform so badly? We can start to see why by considering the same analysis but assuming full
credibility - such that the respective policy regimes are known to stay in place with certainty -
see Table 5.
When policy is fully credible, the optimal policy regime is one of full cooperative commitment
- the Ramsey policy - which by denition cannot be surpassed. However, in contrast to the case
when the policy regimes were subject to transition, the most preferred policy regime outside of
commitment is of optimal scal policy (OF), with the scal authority acting as a Stackelberg
leader with respect to a conservative monetary policy follower who takes scal policy variables
as given. If this is not possible, then a passive scal policy rule in combination with an optimal
conservative monetary policy is next best. The next two regimes imply the same ranking of
scal policy (optimal policy followed by a passive rule), but where the monetary policy is now
less conservative. The worst possible policies then either involve an active scal policy or a
cooperative, but time-consistent optimal monetary and scal policy. This latter policy su¤ers
from the debt stabilization bias discussed in Leeper and Leith (2015). The reason why the
optimal scal policy regime only works under full credibility is due to the spillovers across regimes
discussed above. When transitions are possible, the optimal scal policy regime implies that
the scal authority anticipates the rise in taxes and therefore ination which would take place
12A government with such preferences would appoint a slightly more conservative banker than we estimate with
a coe¢ cient on ination equal to 1.19 rather than 1.
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whenever the economy transitions to a passive scal policy regime. Expecting this, especially
when monetary policy is conservative, the policy maker cuts taxes today to o¤set the inationary
e¤ects of anticipated increase in taxation in the future. This leads to lower ination today, but
an accumulation of government debt and greater subsequent volatility in output and ination.
We can see more clearly the relative performance of the alternative regimes by considering the
counterfactual exercise which assumes di¤erent regimes were in place, but the economy was hit by
the same realization of shocks we obtain from our estimation. Figure 10 runs such a counterfactual
when scal policy is passive. The left hand column considers the case when the passive scal
policy is combined with a less conservative monetary policy. Within each sub-plot we plot series
for the data, the outcomes that would be observed if that passive policy had been in place, but
economic agents had expected the regime to switch according to the estimated probabilities and,
nally, the case where the passive scal policy/less conservative monetary policy regime was fully
credible. The right hand column considers the same series, but for the combination of passive
scal policy and a more conservative monetary policy. Additionally, they plot the outcomes
that would have emerged had either monetary or scal policy accommodated switches in the
dominant policy. In both columns the passive scal policy would have resulted in debt to GDP
ratios being higher in the 1970s and 80s, but would have fallen by more than observed under
the Clinton administration in the mid 1990s. Debt would have been marginally higher under
the more conservative monetary policy (or under any of the accommodation regimes), although
ination would have been signicantly moderated in the 1970s. Credibility does not appear to
be a signicant issue for this regime, implying that this regime is more likely to be a cause of
spillovers to other regimes, than a recipient of spillovers from those regimes.
Figure 11 repeats the exercise for an active scal policy. Here we see that the combination of
an active scal policy and less conservative scal policy would have implied a very similar path
for debt and ination for most of the sample period, although debt would not have fallen around
1995 without the switch to an optimal scal policy around that time. With a more conservative
monetary policy in place the extremes of ination in the 1970s would have been avoided, although
at the cost of higher debt levels from that point on. Essentially, a higher conservatism in monetary
policy results in less reliance on the kinds of stabilization through ination, bond prices and real
interest rates discussed in Leeper and Leith (2015). Again the presence or absence of credibility
has a relatively small impact on the counterfactual outcomes when scal policy is passive.
We now turn to the optimal scal policy regime in Figure 12. In this case the issue of credibility
matters hugely. Without credibility the spillovers from the passive scal policy regime result in
the scal leader moderating tax increases to mitigate the rise in ination caused by expectations
of the rise in taxes that would be adopted following a switch to a passive scal policy rule. Over
time this moderation in tax rises from the scal leader results in an accumulation of government
debt well above that observed in the data. This accumulation of debt would have raised ination
in the latter half of the sample quite signicantly even if monetary policy have been conducted by
a conservative central banker. In contrast, had the optimal scal policy regime been credible then
debt would not have fallen quite so far in the 1970s, especially when paired with a conservative
monetary policy which signicantly reduces the volatility of ination. It is interesting to note
that under the optimal policy the (distortionary) tax rate plays a duel role in both stabilizing
debt and ination and we observe relatively lower (higher) tax rates in periods when ination is
high (low).
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The nal set of counterfactuals (see Figure 13) contrast what our welfare analysis suggested
were the bestregimes - namely, optimal or passive scal policies which were fully credible and
paired with a conservative monetary policy and the monetary accommodation of scal policy
switches when such credibility is not possible - with the cooperative policies under commitment
and discretion. In the second column we plot the outcomes under the cooperative policies,
alongside the data. Under the Ramsey/Commitment policy we obtain a dramatic stabilization
of ination in combination with an e¤ective tax smoothing policy which results in substantial
movements in government debt. The increase in the tax rate in the mid 1980s reects the reversal
in the persistent cost push shock from positive to negative around that time, imply a desirable rise
in taxation to o¤set the habits externality. In contrast, under the time-consistent discretionary
policy there is a temptation to reduce debt through ination surprises (whether induced by
monetary policy or distortionary tax rises) which gives rise to an endogenous inationary bias
problem - what Leith and Wren-Lewis(2013) label a debt stabilization bias. This, in turn, implies
that the policy maker wishes to raise taxes above the tax smoothing level to mitigate this problem
by returning debt to its steady state. Therefore, the time-consistent policy implies a far more
rapid stabilization of debt, where the subsequent increase in debt also reects the reversal of the
cost push shock which is pushing consumption above its rst best level. Contrasting the outcomes
under cooperative policy with those in the rst column we can see that the credible regimes of
scal leadership or a passive scal rule combined with a conservative monetary follower closely
mimic the outcomes under commitment, particularly in the case of scal leadership. It is striking
that allowing the scal and monetary authorities to enter into a strategic game with each other
is clearly welfare improving relative to the case of full cooperation when that cooperative policy
is constrained to be time-consistent. In contrast we only see a relatively modest improvement in
outcomes when such credibility is not achievable.
6 Conclusions
This paper stresses that the evolution of ination dynamics in the US cannot be understood
without reference to the stance of scal policy. Our data preferred model allows monetary policy
to be optimal, but with potential switches between more or less conservative ination aversion,
and scal policy to switch between a passive and active scal rule as well as a role as a time-
consistent Stackelberg leader. This model o¤ers a more nuanced description of the evolution of
monetary and scal policy interactions than the rules-based model. The narrative that the switch
in monetary policy at the time of the Volcker disination was associated with a similar switch
in scal policy making from a regime where the scal authorities did not act to stabilize debt to
one where they did, does not t with our estimates. Instead, we nd that the Volcker disination
occurred around 1982, but wasnt supported by a debt stabilizing scal policy until 1995 and even
then this policy has been subject to further revisions. Moreover, there are numerous switches
between the various permutations of policy regime, with policies often being in conict in the
sense that monetary policy may be strongly anti-inationary when scal policy is failing to act
to stabilize the debt, or the opposite case where scal policy is stabilizing debt, but monetary
policy is not actively targeting ination. In addition, policy changes are still ongoing in that we
have not consistently been in a policy mix where scal policy stabilizes debt and monetary policy
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targets ination even in the recent period. The implicit assumption that allows scal policy to
be safely ignored in monetary policy models does not appear to be supported by the data.
Counterfactuals suggest that eliminating conicts between the scal and monetary authorities
can be just as welfare improving as adopting a goodpolicy permutation when the underlying
policy regimes remain subject to switches. In addition, a more appropriate policy mix could have
avoided the excesses of high ination in the 1970s, but that the cost of this would have been a
higher debt level throughout this period. The ideal time-consistent policy regime would be where
the scal authority acts as a Stackelberg leader and the monetary authority is a conservative
follower. Such a regime can come close to mimicking the outcomes that would have been observed
under a cooperative Ramsey policy. However, this is contingent on the policy being fully credible
in the sense of being not expected to switch to an alternative policy conguration.
It is clear from our estimation that such continuity of regime does not appear to be a feature
of observed monetary and scal policy interactions in the US. If this policy permutation was
potentially subject to switches, it would be preferable to encourage monetary policy to accom-
modate switches in scal policy such that the monetary authority only pursued a conservative
anti-ination policy when the scal authorities implement a passive scal rule or act as a time-
consistent Stackelberg leader.
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A System of Non-linear Equations
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with an associated equation describing the evolution of price dispersion,
R 1
0 (
P (i)t
Pt
) tdi, which is
not need to tie down the equilibrium upon log-linearization. The policy variables Rt,  t; Zt and
Gt then need to be dened.
The Deterministic Steady State
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In order to render this model stationary we need to scale certain variables by the non-
stationary level of technology, At such that kt = Kt=At where Kt = fYt; Ct;Wt=Ptg. Fiscal
variables (i.e. PMt B
M
t =Pt, Gt and Zt) are normalized with respect to Yt. All other real variables
are naturally stationary. Applying this scaling, the steady-state equilibrium conditions reduce to:
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To determine the steady state value of labour, we substitute for X in terms of y and then,
using the aggregate production function, we obtain the following expression,
y+' [(1  g) (1  )] =    1

(1  ); (60)
where g is the steady state share of government spending in output. We shall contrast this
with the labour allocation/output that would be chosen by a social planner to obtain a measure
of the steady-state distortion inherent in this economy which features distortionary taxation,
monopolistic competition and the habits externality.
B The Social Planners Problem
In order to assess the scale of the steady-state ine¢ ciencies caused by the monopolistic competi-
tion, tax and habits externalities it is helpful to contrast the decentralized equilibrium with that
which would be attained under the social planners allocation. The social planner ignores the
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nominal inertia and all other ine¢ ciencies and chooses real allocations that maximize the repre-
sentative consumers utility subject to the aggregate resource constraint, the aggregate production
function, and the law of motion for habits-adjusted consumption:
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The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate of substi-
tution between labor and habit-adjusted consumption and the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution in habit-adjusted consumption
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The steady state equivalent of this expression can be written as,
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where the optimal share of government consumption in output is given by,
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In steady state these can be combined to give the optimal share of government consumption in
output,
G
Y 
= (1 + (1  ) 1  1 (1  ) 1 ) 1
which can then used to get the steady state level of output under the social planners allocation.
[alternatively we can use the data to infer the weight on government spending in the utility
function].
If we contrast this with the allocation achieved in the steady-state of our decentralized equi-
librium (60), assuming that the steady state share of government consumption to GDP is the
same, we can see that the two will be identical whenever the following relationship between the
markup, the tax rate and the degree of habits holds,

   1 =
1  
1   (62)
Notice that in the absence of habits this condition could only be supported by a negative tax rate.
However, for the data given level of taxation and the estimated degree of habits this condition
will dene our steady-state markup, enabling us to adopt an e¢ cient steady-state and thereby
avoiding a steady-state inationary bias problem when describing optimal policy.
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C Derivation of Welfare
Individual utility in period t is
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where Xt = Ct   Ct 1 is the habit-adjusted aggregate consumption. Before considering the
elements of the utility function, we need to note the following general result relating to second
order approximations
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where bYt = ln  YtY  and O[2] represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in the bound on the
amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various places in the derivation of welfare.
Now consider the second order approximation to the rst term,
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where tip represents terms independent of policy. Using the results above this can be rewritten
in terms of hatted variables
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In pure consumption terms, the value of Xt can be approximated to second order by:
bXt = 1
1  
bct + 1
2
bc2t  1  
bct 1 + 1
2
bc2t 1  12 bX2t +O[2]
and to a rst order, bXt = 1
1  bct   1  bct 1 +O[1]
which implies bX2t = 1(1  )2 (bct   bct 1)2 +O[2]
Therefore,
X1 t 
 
t
1   = X
1 

1
1  
bct + 1
2
bc2t  1  
bct 1 + 1
2
bc2t 1+ 12 ( ) bX2t    bXtbt

+tip+O[2]
Summing over the future,
1X
t=0
t
X1 t 
 
t
1   = X
1 
1X
t=0
t

1  
1  
bct + 1
2
bc2t  12 bX2t    bXtbt

+ tip+O[2]:
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Similarly for the term in government spending,

g1 t 
 
t
1   = g
1 fbgt + 1
2
(1  )bg2t   bgtbtg+ tip+O[2]
While the term in labour supply can be written as
N1+'t 
 
t
1 + '
= N
1+'
 bNt + 1
2
(1 + ') bN2t    bNtbt+ tip+O[2]
Now we need to relate the labour input to output and a measure of price dispersion. Aggre-
gating the individual rmsdemand for labour yields,
Nt = (
Yt
At
)
Z 1
0
(
P (i)t
Pt
) tdi
It can be shown (see Woodford, 2003, Chapter 6) that
bNt = byt + ln[Z 1
0
(
P (i)t
Pt
) tdi]
= byt + 
2
varifp(i)tg+O[2]
which implies bN2t = by2t
so we can write
N1+'t
1 + '
= N
1+'
byt + 1
2
(1 + ') by2t   bytbt + 2varifpt(i)g

+ tip+O[2]
Welfare is then given by
 0 = X
1 
E0
1X
t=0
t

1  
1  
bct + 1
2
bc2t  12X^2t    bXtbt

+g1 E0
1X
t=0
tfbgt + 1
2
(1  )bg2t   bgtbtg
 N1+'E0
1X
t=0
t
byt + 1
2
(1 + ') by2t   bytbt + 2varifpt(i)g

+tip+O[2]
From the steady-state of our model, and its comparison with the social planners allocation we
know that X
1 
(1   ) = (1   ) cyN
1+'
. Similarly, assuming the same share of government
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spending in GDP across the social planners and decentralized equilibrium, we also know that,
g1  = gyN
1+'
Using the fact that,
c
y
bct = byt   (1  c
y
)bgt   1
2
c
y
bc2t   12(1  cy )bg2t + 12by2t +O[2]
we can collect the levels terms and write the sum of discounted utilities as:
 0 =  1
2
N
1+'
E0
1X
t=0
t
8>><>>:
(1 )
1 
c
y
 bXt + bt2 +  gy bgt + bt2
+(')
byt   'bt2
+varifpt(i)g
9>>=>>;+ tip+O[2] (63)
Using the result from Eser et al (2009) that
1X
t=0
tvari[pt(i)] =

(1  )(1  )
1X
t=0
t

2t +
 1
(1  ) [t   t 1]
2

+O[2]:
we can write the discounted sum of utility as,
 0 =  1
2
N
1+'
E0
1X
t=0
t
8<:
(1 )
1 
c
y
 bXt + bt2 + (')byt   'bt2
+ (1 )(1 )

2t +
 1
(1 ) [t   t 1]2

9=;+ tip+O[2] (64)
where we have put the terms in public consumption into tip since they are treated as an exogenous
process and therefore independent of policy.
D Leadership Equilibria under Discretion withMarkov
Switching in Objectives
This section demonstrates how to solve non-cooperative dynamic games in the Markov jump-
linear quadratic systems. Consider an economy with two policy makers: a leader (L) and a
follower (F ).
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt +A12jt+1xt +B11jt+1u
L
t +B12jt+1u
F
t + Cjt+1"t+1; (65)
EtHjt+1xt+1 = A21jtXt +A22jtxt +B21jtu
L
t +B22jtu
F
t ; (66)
whereXt is a n1 vector of predetermined variables; xt is a n2 vector of forward-looking variables;
ut =
 
uL0t ; uF 0t
0
are the control variables, and "t contains a vector of zero mean i:i:d: shocks.
Without loss of generality, the shocks are normalized so that the covariance matrix of "t is the
identity matrix, I: Therefore, the covariance matrix of the shocks to Xt+1 is C 0jtCjt :
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The matrices A11jt , A21jt , A12jt ; A22jt ; Hjt ; B11jt ; B12jt ; B21jt ; and B22jt can each take n
di¤erent values; corresponding to the n modes jt = 1; 2; :::n in period t:The modes jt follow a
Markov process with constant transition probabilities:
Pjk = Pr fjt+1 = kjjt = jg , j; k = 1; 2; :::; n:
Furthermore, P denotes the nn transition matrix [Pjk] and the 1n vector p = (p1t; :::; pnt) ;where
pjt = Pr fjt = jg ; jt = 1; 2; :::n denotes the probability distribution of the modes in period t;
pt+1 = ptP:
Finally, the 1 n vector p denotes the unique stationary distribution of the modes,
p = pP:
We assume that the intertemporal loss functions of the two policy makers are dened by the
quadratic loss function
Et
1X
=0
1
2
Lujt+ ;
where Lujt is the period loss with u = F for the follower and u = L for the leader, respectively.
As with the structure parameter matrices in (65) and (66), Lujt can also take di¤erent value
corresponding to the n modes in period t: The period loss satises
Lujt = Y
u0
t 
u
jtY
u
t ;
where ujt is a symmetric and positive semi-denite weight matrix: Y
u
t are nY vectors of target
variables for the follower and leader.
Y ut = D
u
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775 :
It follows that the period loss function can be rewritten as
Lujt =
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
0
W ujt
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775 ; (67)
where W ujt = D
u0ujtD
u is symmetric and positive semidenite, and
W ujt =
2664
Qu11jt Q
u
12jt
P u11jt P
u
12jt
Qu21jt Q
u
22jt
P u21jt P
u
22jt
P u011jt P
u0
21jt
Ru11jt R
u
12jt
P u012jt P
u0
22jt
Ru012jt R
u
22jt
3775
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is partitioned with Xt; xt; uLt and u
F
t :
The follower and leader decide their policy uFt and u
L
t in period t to minimize their intertem-
poral loss functions dened in (67) under discretion subject to (65), (66), Xt and jt given. The
follower also observes the current decision uLt of the leader. Furthermore, two policy makers an-
ticipate that they will reoptimize in period t+1: Reoptimization will result in the two instruments
and the forward-looking variables in period t+ 1 being functions of the predetermined variables
and the mode in period t+ 1 according to
uLt+1 =  FLjt+1Xt+1; (68)
uFt+1 =  GFjt+1Xt+1  DFjt+1uLt+1; (69)
xt+1 =  Njt+1Xt+1; (70)
where jt+1 = 1; :::; n are the n modes at period t+1: The dynamics of the predetermined variables
will follow
Xt+1 =Mjtkt+1Xt + Cjt+1"t+1; (71)
where
Mjtkt+1 = A11jt+1  A12jt+1Njt  B11jt+1FLjt  B12jt+1GFjt +B12jt+1DFjtFLjt ;
First, by (70) and (65) we have,
EtHjt+1xt+1 =  EtHjt+1Njt+1Xt+1
=  EtHjt+1Njt+1
 
A11jt+1Xt +A12jt+1xt +B11jt+1u
L
t +B12jt+1u
F
t

(where EtHjt+1Njt+1 =
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1Hkt+1Nkt+1 , conditional on jt = 1; 2; :::n at the period t:)
Combining this with (66) gives
EtHjt+1Njt+1
 
A11jt+1Xt +A12jt+1xt +B11jt+1u
L
t +B12jt+1u
F
t

= A21jtXt +A22jtxt +B21jtu
L
t +B22jtu
F
t :
Solving for xt we obtain
xt =  JjtXt  KLjtuLt  KFjtuFt ; (72)
where
Jjt =
 
A22j +
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1Hkt+1Nkt+1A12k
! 1 
A21j +
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1Hkt+1Nkt+1A11k
!
;
KLjt =
 
A22j +
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1Hkt+1Nkt+1A12k
! 1 
B21j +
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1Hkt+1Nkt+1B11k
!
;
KFjt =
 
A22j +
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1Hkt+1Nkt+1A12k
! 1 
B22j +
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1Hkt+1Nkt+1B12k
!
:
35
We assume that A22jt +
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1Hkt+1Nkt+1A12k is invertible.
Second, substituting xt from (65) using (72) gives
Xt+1 = eAjtkt+1Xt + eBLjtkt+1uLt + eBFjtkt+1uFt + Cjt+1"t+1; (73)
where
eAjtkt+1 = A11kt+1  A12kt+1Jjt ;eBLjtkt+1 = B11kt+1  A12kt+1KLjt ;eBFjtkt+1 = B12kt+1  A12kt+1KFjt :
D.1 Policy of the Follower
Using (72) in the followers loss function (67) gives
LFjt =
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
0 2664
QF11jt Q
F
12jt
PF11jt P
F
12jt
QF21jt Q
F
22jt
PF21jt P
F
22jt
PF 011jt P
F 0
21jt
RF11jt R
F
12jt
PF 012jt P
F 0
22jt
RF 012jt R
F
22jt
3775
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
=
24 XtuLt
uFt
350
264 eQFjt ePF1jt ePF2jtePF 01jt eRF11jt eRF12jtePF 02jt eRF 012jt eRF22jt
375
24 XtuLt
uFt
35 (74)
where
eQFjt = QF11jt  QF12jtJjt   J 0jtQF21jt + J 0jtQF22jtJjt (75)ePF1jt = PF11jt  QF12jtKLjt + J 0jtQF22jtKLjt   J 0jtPF21jt (76)ePF2jt = PF12jt  QF12jtKFjt + J 0jtQF22jtKFjt   J 0jtPF22jt (77)eRF11jt = KL0jt QF22jtKLjt  KL0jt PF21jt   PF 021jtKLjt +RF11jt (78)eRF12jt = KL0jt QF22jtKFjt  KL0jt PF22jt  RF12jtKFjt +RF12jt (79)eRF22jt = KF 0jt QF22jtKFjt  KF 0jt PF22jt   PF 022jtKFjt +RF22jt (80)
The optimal value of the problem in period t is associated with the symmetric positive semi-
denite matrix V Fkt+1 and it satises the Bellman equation:
XtV
F
jt Xt = min
uFjt
n
LFjt + Et
h
X 0t+1V
F
kt+1Xt+1
io
(81)
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subject to (73) and (74). The rst-order condition with respect to uFt is
0 = X 0t ePF2jt + uL0t eRF12jt + uF 0t eRF22jt + EtX 0t eA0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1
+Etu
L0
t
eBL0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1 + EtuF 0t eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1 :
This leads to the optimal policy function uFt of the follower
uFt =  GFjt+1Xt+1  DFjt+1uLt+1; (82)
where
GFjt+1 =
 eRF 022jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1
! 1 ePF 02jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eAjtkt+1
!
;
DFjt+1 =
 eRF 022jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1
! 1 eRF 012jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fk+1 eBLjtkt+1
!
:
Furthermore, using (82) and (68) in (72) gives
xt =  NjtXt;
where
Njt = Jjt  KLjtFLjt  KFjtGFjt +KFjtDFjtFLjt ;
and using (82) and (68) and (??) in (65) gives
Xt+1 =Mjtkt+1Xt + Cjt+1"t+1;
where
Mjtkt+1 = A11jt+1  A12jt+1Njt  B11jt+1FLjt  B12jt+1GFjt +B12jt+1DFjtFLjt
Finally, using (68) and (82) in (81) results in
V Fjt =
eQFjt   ePF1jtFLjt   FL0jt ePF 01jt + FL0jt eRF11jtFLjt (83)
+
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt0 V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt
 
" ePF 02jt   eRF 012jtFLjt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt
#0
 eRF 022jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1
! 1
(84)" ePF 02jt   eRF 012jtFLjt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt
#
:
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D.2 Policy of the Leader
Using (72) and (82) in the leaders loss function (67) gives
LLjt =
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
0 2664
QL11jt Q
L
12jt
PL11jt P
L
12jt
QL21jt Q
L
22jt
PL21jt P
L
22jt
PL011jt P
L0
21jt
RL11jt R
L
12jt
PL012jt P
L0
22jt
RL012jt R
L
22jt
3775
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
=

Xt
uLt
0 " eQLjt ePLjtePL0jt eRLjt
# 
Xt
uLt

; (85)
where
eQLjt = QL11jt   PL12jtGFjt  GF 0jt PL012jt +GF 0jt RL22jtGFjt  QL12jt eJjt (86)
  eJ 0jtQL21jt + eJ 0jtQL22jt eJjt + eJ 0jtPL22jtGFjt +GF 0jt PL022jt eJjt ;ePLjt = PL11jt  QL12jt eKjt   PL12jtDFjt + eJ 0jtQL22jt eKjt   eJ 0jtPL21jt (87)
+ eJ 0jtPL22jtDFjt +GF 0jt PL022jt eKjt  GF 0jt RL012jt +GF 0jt RL22jtDFjt ;eRLjt = RL11jt + eK 0jtQL22jt eKjt  RL12jtDFjt  DF 0jt RL012jt +DF 0jt RL22jtDFjt (88)
  eK 0jtPL21jt + eK 0jtPL22jtDFjt   PL021jt eKjt +DF 0jt PL022jt eKjt :
and eJjt = Jjt  KFjtGFjt and eKjt = KLjt  KFjtDFjt
The value of the problem in period t is associated with the symmetric positive semidenite
matrix V Lkt+1 and it satises the Bellman equation
XtV
L
jtXt = min
uLjt
n
LLjt + Et
h
X 0t+1V
L
kt+1Xt+1
io
; (89)
subject to (85), (73) and (82) . The rst-order condition with respect to uLt is
0 = X 0t ePLjt + uL0t eRLjt + EtX 0t  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt0 V Lkt+1  eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt
+Etu
L0
t
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt ;
This leads to the optimal policy function of the leader
uLt =  FLj Xt; (90)
where
FLj =
" eRL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt
# 1
" ePL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt
#
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Furthermore, using (82) and (90) in (72) gives
xt =  NjtXt; (91)
where
Njt = Jjt  KLjtFLjt  KFjtGFjt +KFjtDFjtFLjt ;
and using (82), (90) and (91) in (65) gives
Xt+1 =Mjtkt+1Xt + Cjt+1"t+1;
where
Mjtkt+1 = A11jt+1  A12jt+1Njt  B11jt+1FLjt  B12jt+1GFjt +B12jt+1DFjtFLjt
Finally, using (90) and (73) in (89) results in
V Ljt =
eQLjt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt0 V Lk  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt (92)
 
" ePL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt
#
" eRL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt
# 1
" ePL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt
#
To sum up, the rst order conditions to the optimization problem (65), (66) and (67) can be
written in the following form:
Njt = Jjt  KLjtFLjt  KFjtGFjt +KFjtDFjtFLjt ; (93)
V Fjt  eQFjt   ePF1jtFLjt   FL0jt ePF 01jt + FL0jt eRF11jtFLjt (94)
+
nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt0 V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt
 
" ePF 02jt   eRF 012jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1 + eBLjtkt+1FLjt
#0
 eRF 022jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1
! 1
" ePF 02jt   eRF 012jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1 + eBLjtkt+1FLjt
#
;
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V Ljt  eQLjt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt0 V Lk  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt (95)
 
" ePL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt
#0
" eRL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt
# 1
" ePL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt
#
;
FLj =
" eRL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt
# 1
(96)" ePL0jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eBLjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1DFjt0 V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1GFjt
#
;
GFjt+1 =
 eRF 022jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1
! 1 ePF 02jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eAjtkt+1
!
;(97)
DFjt+1 =
 eRF 022jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1
! 1 eRF 012jt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
eBF 0jtkt+1V Fk+1 eBLjtkt+1
!
:(98)
The discretion equilibrium is a xed point

Nj ; V
L
j ; V
F
j


n
Njt ; V
L
jt
; V Fjt
on
jt=1
of the mapping
and a corresponding

FLj ; G
F
j ; D
F
j


n
FLjt ; G
F
jt
; DFjt
on
jt=1
. The xed point can be obtained as
the limit of

Njt; V
L
jt ; V
F
jt

when t  !  1:
E Nash Equilibrium under Discretion with Markov
Switching in Objectives
Under Nash, the two policy makers decide their policy uLt and u
F
t simultaneously. It is therefore
arbitrary which we label leader and follower. The policy reaction of the follower (F ) can not
include the leader (L)s contemporary policy instrument, therefore, DFjt+1 = 0 in (69). Reopti-
mization in period t + 1 result in the two instruments and the forward-looking variables being
functions of the predetermined variables and the mode as follows
40
uLt+1 =  FLjt+1Xt+1; (99)
uFt+1 =  FFjt+1Xt+1; (100)
xt+1 =  Njt+1Xt+1; (101)
E.1 Policy of the Follower
Using (72) and (99) in the followers loss function (67) gives
LFjt =
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
0 2664
QF11jt Q
F
12jt
PF11jt P
F
12jt
QF21jt Q
F
22jt
PF21jt P
F
22jt
PF 011jt P
F 0
21jt
RF11jt R
F
12jt
PF 012jt P
F 0
22jt
RF 012jt R
F
22jt
3775
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
=

Xt
uFt
0 " eQFjt ePFjtePF 0jt eRFjt
# 
Xt
uFt

(102)
where
eQFjt = QF11jt  QF12jt eJLjt   PF11jtFLjt   eJL0jt QF21jt + eJL0jt QF22jt eJLjt + eJL0jt PF21jtFLjt (103)
 FL0jt PF 011jt + FL0jt PF 021jt eJLjt + FL0jt RF11jtFLjt ;ePFjt =  QF12jtKFjt + PF12jt + eJL0jt QF22jtKFjt   eJL0jt PF22jt + FL0jt PF 021jtKFjt   FL0jt RF12jt ; (104)eRFjt = KFjtQF22jtKFjt  KFjtPF22jt   PF 022jtKFjt +RF22jt ; (105)
and eJLjt = Jjt  KLjtFLjt.
The optimal value of the problem in period t is associated with the symmetric positive semi-
denite matrix V Fkt+1 and it satises the Bellman equation:
XtV
F
jt Xt = min
uFjt
n
LFjt + Et
h
X 0t+1V
F
kt+1Xt+1
io
(106)
subject to (73), (99) and (102). The rst-order condition with respect to uFt is
0 = X 0t ePFjt + uF 0t eRFjt + EtX 0t  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt0 V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1 + EtuF 0t eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1 ;
The optimal policy function of the follower is given by
uFt =  FFjtXt; (107)
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where
FFjt =
 eRF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1 1 h ePF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjti
Furthermore, using (107) and (99) in (72) gives
xt =  NjtXt; (108)
where
Njt = Jjt  KLjtFLjt  KFjtFFjt ;
and using (107),(108) and (99) in (65) gives
Xt+1 =Mjtkt+1Xt + Cjt+1"t+1;
where
Mjtkt+1 = A11jt+1  A12jt+1Njt  B11jt+1FLjt+1  B12jt+1FFjt
Finally, using (99) and (107) in (106) results in
V Fjt =
eQFjt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eA0jtkt+1   FL0jt+1 eBL0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt+1 (109)
 
h ePF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjti0h eRF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1i 1h ePF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjti
E.2 Policy of the Leader
Using (72) and (100) in the followers loss function (67) gives
LFjt =
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
0 2664
QL11jt Q
L
12jt
PL11jt P
L
12jt
QL21jt Q
L
22jt
PL21jt P
L
22jt
PL011jt P
L0
21jt
RL11jt R
L
12jt
PL012jt P
L0
22jt
RL012jt R
L
22jt
3775
2664
Xt
xt
uLt
uFt
3775
=

Xt
uLt
0 " eQLjt ePLjtePL0jt eRLjt
# 
Xt
uLt

(110)
where eJFjt = Jjt  KFjtFFjt and
42
eQLjt = QL11jt  QL12jt eJFjt   PL12jtFFjt   eJF 0jt QL21jt + eJF 0jt QL22jt eJFjt + eJF 0jt PL22jtFFjt (111)
 FF 0jt PL012jt + FF 0jt PL022jt eJFjt + FF 0jt RL22jtFFjt ;ePLjt =  QL12jtKLjt + PL11jt + eJF 0jt QL22jtKLjt   eJF 0jt PL21jt + FF 0jt PL022jtKLjt   FF 0jt RL012jt ; (112)eRLjt = KL0jt QL22jtKLjt  KL0jt PL21jt   PL021jtKLjt +RL11jt (113)
The optimal value of the problem in period t is associated with the symmetric positive semi-
denite matrix V Lkt+1 and it satises the Bellman equation:
XtV
L
jtXt = min
uLjt
n
LLjt + Et
h
X 0t+1V
L
kt+1Xt+1
io
(114)
subject to (73), (100) and (110). The rst-order condition with respect to uLt is
0 = X 0t ePFjt + uL0t eRFjt + EtX 0t  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt 0 V Lkt+1 eBLjtkt+1 + EtuL0t eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1 eBLjtkt+1
The optimal policy function of the leader is given by
uLt =  FLjtXt; (115)
where
FLjt =
 eRF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1 eBLjtkt+1 1h ePF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt i :
Furthermore, using (107) and (115) in (72) gives
xt =  NjtXt; (116)
where
Njt = Jjt  KLjtFLjt  KFjtFFjt
and using (107) and (115) and (116) in (65) gives
Xt+1 =Mjtkt+1Xt + Cjt+1"t+1;
where
Mjtkt+1 = A11jt+1  A12jt+1Njt  B11jt+1FLjt+1  B12jt+1FFjt :
Finally, using (115) and (107) in (114) results in
43
V Ljt =
eQLjt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eA0jtkt+1   FF 0jt eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt  (117)
 
h ePF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt i0 eRF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1 eBLjtkt+1 1h ePF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt i
To sum up, the rst order conditions to the optimization problem (65), (66) and (67) can be
written in the following form:
Njt = Jjt  KLjtFLjt  KFjtFFjt ;
V Fjt =
eQFjt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eA0jtkt+1   FL0jt+1 eBL0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjt+1 (118)
 
h ePF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjti0h eRF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1i 1h ePF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjti ;
V Ljt =
eQLjt +  nX
k=1
Pjtkt+1
 eA0jtkt+1   FF 0jt eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt  (119)
 
h ePF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt i0 eRF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1 eBLjtkt+1 1h ePF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt i ;
FFjt =
 eRF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1 eBFjtkt+1 1 h ePF 0jt + Et eBF 0jtkt+1V Fkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBLjtkt+1FLjti ;
(120)
FLjt =
 eRF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1 eBLjtkt+1 1 h ePF 0jt + Et eBL0jtkt+1V Lkt+1  eAjtkt+1   eBFjtkt+1FFjt i :
(121)
44
The discretion equilibrium is a xed point

Nj ; V
L
j ; V
F
j


n
Njt ; V
L
jt
; V Fjt
on
jt=1
of the mapping
and a corresponding

FLj ; F
F
j


n
FLjt ; F
F
jt
on
jt=1
. The xed point can be obtained as the limit of
Njt; V
L
jt ; V
F
jt

when t  !  1:
F Data Appendix
We followed Bianchi and Ilut (2015) when construct our scal variables. The scal variables,
such as government spending and tax revenues, are taken from National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) Table 3.2 (Federal Government Current Receipts and Expenditures) released
by the Bureau of Economics Analysis. These data series are nominal and in levels.
Government Spending. Government spending is dened as the sum of consumption ex-
penditure (line 21), gross government investment (line 42), net purchases of nonproduced assets
(line 44), minus consumption of xed capital (line 45), minus wage accruals less disbursements
(line 33).
Total tax revenues. Total tax revenues are constructed as the di¤erence between current
receipts (line 38) and current transfer receipts (line 16).
Federal government debt. Federal government debt is the market value of privately held
gross Federal debt, which is downloaded from Dallas Fed web-site
The above three scal variables are normalized with respect to Nominal GDP. Nominal
GDP is taken from NIPA Table 1.1.5 (Gross Domestic Product).
Real GDP. Real GDP is take download from NIPA Table 1.1.6 (Real Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, Chained Dollars)
The GDP deator. The GDP deator is obtained from NIPA Table 1.1.5 (Gross Domestic
Product).
E¤ective Federal Funds Rate. E¤ective Federal Funds Rate is taken from the St. Louis
Fed website.
Finally, we calculate the total government transfers to contrast with the exogenous AR(1)
transfer shock in Figure 6. All data used to construct government transfers are taken from NIPA
Table 3.2. Total government transfers is dened as current transfer payments (line 22) minus
current transfer receipts (line 16) plus capital transfers payments (line 43) minus capital transfer
receipts (line 39) plus subsidies (line 32).
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Figure 1: Data
46
Pas s iv e  Fis c a l Po lic y
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ac tiv e  Fis c a l Po lic y
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ac tiv e  Moneta ry  Po lic y
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
H igh  Vo latility
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 2: Regime Switching Rules I
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Figure 3: Regime Switching Rules II
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Figure 4: Regime Switching Optimal Policy I
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Figure 5: Regime Switching Optimal Policy II
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Figure 6: Estimated Regimes IRF
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Figure 7: Credible Regimes IRF
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Figure 8: Eliminating Conict IRF
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Figure 9: Contribution of Shocks to Trends in Debt to GDP and Ination.
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Figure 10: Passive Fiscal Policy Counterfactual
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Figure 11: Active Fiscal Policy Counterfactual
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Figure 12: Optimal Fiscal Policy Counterfactual
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Figure 13: BestPolicy Regimes Counterfactual
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Table 1 Model Comparison
Models Geweke(1999)
Bayes factor
rel. to of&pf&af
Sims et al.(2008)
(qL statistic)
op&pf&af -1341.2083 1
-1341.074
(0.178)
pf&af -1348.4564 exp [7:248]
-1347.2503
(0.138)
op&pf -1350.0912 exp [8:883]
-1349.36
(0.155)
Rules-Based policy -1417.001 exp [75:793]
-1417.4422
(0.1007)
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Table 2: Rules-Based Policy (Monetary-Fiscal Mix)
Parameters Mode 5% 95% Type Mean Std Dev
Active Monetary-Passive Fiscal
R;lagged interest rate 0.859 0.833 0.887 Beta 0.50 0.25
 1:interest rate resp. to ination 2.898 2.583 3.214 Gamma 2.00 0.50
 2;interest rate resp. to output 0.360 0.175 0.550 Gamma 0.50 0.25
 ;lagged tax rate 0.909 0.874 0.943 Beta 0.50 0.25
 ;tax rate resp. to debt 0.031 0.017 0.045 Gamma 0.07 0.02
y;tax rate resp. to output 0.055 0.003 0.109 Gamma 0.10 0.10
Active Monetary-Active Fiscal
R;lagged interest rate 0.534 0.417 0.638 Beta 0.50 0.25
 1:interest rate resp. to ination 1.351 1.199 1.506 Gamma 2.00 0.50
 2;interest rate resp. to output 0.460 0.293 0.633 Gamma 0.50 0.25
 ;lagged tax rate 0.666 0.563 0.761 Beta 0.50 0.25
 ;tax rate resp. to debt 0 - - F - -
y;tax rate resp. to output 0.055 0.003 0.109 Gamma 0.10 0.10
Passive Monetary-Passive Fiscal
R;lagged interest rate 0.847 0.800 0.892 Beta 0.50 0.25
 1:interest rate resp. to ination 0.805 0.697 0.917 Gamma 0.80 0.30
 2;interest rate resp. to output 0.347 0.141 0.551 Gamma 0.50 0.25
 ;lagged tax rate 0.422 0.293 0.553 Beta 0.50 0.25
 ;tax rate resp. to debt 0.079 0.056 0.105 Gamma 0.07 0.02
y;tax rate resp. to output 0.055 0.003 0.109 Gamma 0.10 0.10
Passive Monetary-Active Fiscal
R;lagged interest rate 0.847 0.800 0.892 Beta 0.50 0.25
 1:interest rate resp. to ination 0.805 0.697 0.917 Gamma 0.80 0.30
 2;interest rate resp. to output 0.347 0.141 0.551 Gamma 0.50 0.25
 ;lagged tax rate 0.666 0.563 0.761 Beta 0.50 0.25
 ;tax rate resp. to debt 0 - - F - -
y;tax rate resp. to output 0.055 0.003 0.109 Gamma 0.10 0.10
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Table 2: Rules-Based Policy (continued)
Parameters Mode 5% 95% Type Mean Std Dev
;Inv. of intertemp. elas. of subst. 2.577 2.337 2.817 Normal 2.50 0.25
;Calvo parameter 0.780 0.752 0.810 Beta 0.75 0.02
;ination inertia 0.214 0.135 0.295 Beta 0.50 0.15
;habit persistence 0.605 0.448 0.762 Beta 0.50 0.15
';Inverse of Frisch elasticity 2.377 2.132 2.625 Normal 2.50 0.25
Serial correl. and std. of shocks
;AR coe¤., taste shock 0.877 0.832 0.925 Beta 0.50 0.15
;AR coe¤., cost-push shock 0.278 0.096 0.456 Beta 0.50 0.15
z;AR coe¤., productivity shock 0.345 0.250 0.447 Beta 0.50 0.15
tr;AR coe¤., transfer shock 0.558 0.473 0.648 Beta 0.50 0.15
g;AR coe¤., government spending 0.981 0.971 0.991 Beta 0.50 0.15
(s=1);taste shock (L) 0.404 0.280 0.513 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
(s=2);taste shock (H) 1.010 0.721 1.284 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
(s=1);cost-push shock (L) 2.481 1.425 3.606 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
(s=2);cost-push shock (H) 4.603 4.131 5.000 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
z(s=1);productivity shock (L) 0.549 0.447 0.651 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
z(s=2);productivity shock (H) 1.221 1.045 1.402 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
g;government shock 0.248 0.229 0.268 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
tr;transfer shock 4.066 3.673 4.449 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
 ;tax rate shock 0.356 0.325 0.388 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
R;interest rate shock 0.213 0.192 0.234 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
Transition probs
p11;monetary policy: remaining active 0.972 0.956 0.988 Beta 0.90 0.05
p22;monetary policy: remaining passive 0.867 0.833 0.901 Beta 0.90 0.05
q11;scal policy: remaining passive 0.910 0.883 0.937 Beta 0.90 0.05
q22;scal policy: remaining active 0.880 0.849 0.914 Beta 0.90 0.05
z11;volatility: remaining with low volatility 0.933 0.888 0.978 Beta 0.90 0.05
z22;volatility: remaining with high volatility 0.924 0.877 0.973 Beta 0.90 0.05
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Table 3: Optimal Policy (Monetary-Fiscal Mix)
Parameters Mode 5% 95% Type Mean Std Dev
!1;gap term, X^t   ^t 0.164 0.126 0.210 Beta 0.50 0.15
!2;gap term, y^t   ' ^t 0.183 0.141 0.216 Beta 0.50 0.15
Conservative Monetary-Optimal Fiscal
!R;change in interest rate 0.734 0.604 0.879 Beta 0.50 0.15
!;ination 1 - - F - -
! ;change in tax rate 0.728 0.564 0.855 Beta 0.50 0.15
!f;ination 0.335 0.232 0.445 Gamma 1.00 0.30
Less Conservative Monetary-Optimal Fiscal
!R;change in interest rate 0.734 0.604 0.879 Beta 0.50 0.15
!;ination 0.442 0.347 0.539 Beta 0.50 0.15
! ;change in tax rate 0.728 0.564 0.855 Beta 0.50 0.15
!f;ination 0.335 0.232 0.445 Gamma 1.00 0.30
Conservative Monetary-Passive Fiscal
!R;change in interest rate 0.734 0.604 0.879 Beta 0.50 0.15
!;ination 1 - - F - -
 ;lagged tax rate 0.965 0.956 0.974 Beta 0.50 0.25
 ;tax rate resp. to debt 0.050 0.047 0.053 Gamma 0.07 0.02
y;tax rate resp. to output 0.038 0.001 0.074 Gamma 0.10 0.10
Less Conservative Monetary-Passive Fiscal
!R;change in interest rate 0.734 0.604 0.879 Beta 0.50 0.15
!;ination 0.442 0.347 0.539 Beta 0.50 0.15
 ;lagged tax rate 0.965 0.956 0.974 Beta 0.50 0.25
 ;tax rate resp. to debt 0.050 0.047 0.053 Gamma 0.07 0.02
y;tax rate resp. to output 0.038 0.001 0.074 Gamma 0.10 0.10
Conservative Monetary-Active Fiscal
!R;change in interest rate 0.734 0.604 0.879 Beta 0.50 0.15
!;ination 1 - - F - -
 ;lagged tax rate 0.912 0.888 0.937 Beta 0.50 0.25
 ;tax rate resp. to debt 0 - - F - -
y;tax rate resp. to output 0.038 0.001 0.074 Gamma 0.10 0.10
Less Conservative Monetary-Active Fiscal
!R;change in interest rate 0.734 0.604 0.879 Beta 0.50 0.15
!;ination 0.442 0.347 0.539 Beta 0.50 0.15
 ;lagged tax rate 0.912 0.888 0.937 Beta 0.50 0.25
 ;tax rate resp. to debt 0 - - F - -
y;tax rate resp. to output 0.038 0.001 0.074 Gamma 0.10 0.10
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Table 3: Optimal Policy (continued)
Parameters Mode 5% 95% Type Mean Std Dev
;Inv. of intertemp. elas. of subst. 2.913 2.736 3.076 Normal 2.50 0.25
;Calvo parameter 0.795 0.773 0.817 Beta 0.75 0.02
;ination inertia 0.270 0.182 0.367 Beta 0.50 0.15
;habit persistence 0.563 0.421 0.743 Beta 0.50 0.15
';Inverse of Frisch elasticity 2.265 2.128 2.385 Normal 2.50 0.25
g;govt.spending rule resp. to debt -0.015 -0.022 -0.007 Normal 0.00 0.10
Serial correl. and std. of shocks
;AR coe¤., taste shock 0.931 0.915 0.947 Beta 0.50 0.15
;AR coe¤., cost-push shock 0.946 0.930 0.962 Beta 0.50 0.15
z;AR coe¤., productivity shock 0.263 0.193 0.332 Beta 0.50 0.15
tr;AR coe¤., transfer shock 0.871 0.840 0.901 Beta 0.50 0.15
g;AR coe¤., government spending 0.983 0.977 0.989 Beta 0.50 0.15
(s=1);taste shock (L) 0.731 0.127 0.524 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
(s=2);taste shock (H) 2.545 1.840 3.213 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
(s=1);cost-push shock (L) 0.467 0.386 0.545 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
(s=2);cost-push shock (H) 1.408 1.233 1.589 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
z(s=1);productivity shock (L) 0.685 0.613 0.765 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
z(s=2);productivity shock (H) 1.117 0.975 1.246 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
g;government shock 0.163 0.150 0.176 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
tr;transfer shock 1.732 1.612 1.844 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
 ;tax rate shock 0.244 0.220 0.266 Inv. Gamma 0.50 2
Transition probs
p11;monetary policy: remaining conservative 0.909 0.886 0.931 Beta 0.90 0.05
p22;monetary policy: remaining less conservative 0.921 0.895 0.944 Beta 0.90 0.05
q11;scal policy: remaining optimal 0.882 0.852 0.914 Dirichlet 0.90 0.05
q12;optimal to passive scal policy 0.009 0.0004 0.017 Dirichlet 0.05 0.05
q22;scal policy: remaining passive 0.962 0.946 0.979 Dirichlet 0.90 0.05
q23;passive to active scal policy 0.006 0.0001 0.012 Dirichlet 0.05 0.05
q33;scal policy: remaining active 0.922 0.898 0.945 Dirichlet 0.90 0.05
q31;active to optimal scal policy 0.005 0.0001 0.010 Dirichlet 0.05 0.05
z11;volatility: remaining with low volatility 0.956 0.935 0.978 Beta 0.90 0.05
z22;volatility: remaining with high volatility 0.893 0.865 0.925 Beta 0.90 0.05
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Table 4: Unconditional Variances and Welfare With Regime Switching
Regime Output Inflation Interest Rate Tax Rate Welfare Cost
Low Volatility
PF/LC 1.22 0.75 0.66 6.23 2.60
MA 1.40 0.33 0.40 5.31 2.60
PF/MC 1.4 0.34 0.60 7.51 2.61
FA 1.51 0.45 0.50 4.00 2.62
AF/LC 3.92 1.95 1.36 0.004 3.00
OF/MC 4.89 0.78 0.87 2.06 3.06
AF/MC 7.64 0.97 0.93 0.01 3.23
OF/LC 5.21 2.28 1.56 3.58 3.43
High Volatility
PF/LC 1.40 1.25 1.03 6.73 24.68
MA 1.63 0.58 0.72 5.56 24.69
PF/MC 1.69 0.56 0.92 7.84 24.75
FA 1.75 0.79 0.84 4.20 24.75
AF/LC 4.24 2.50 1.76 0.004 25.24
AF/MC 8.08 1.20 1.29 0.01 25.49
OF/MC 6.85 1.19 1.38 6.01 26.20
OF/LC 7.15 3.41 2.35 9.03 27.16
Key to the Table: AF - Active Fiscal, PF - Passive Fiscal, OF - Optimal Fiscal Policy
(Stackelberg Leadership), MC - More Conservative Optimal Monetary, LC - Less Conservative
Optimal Monetary, MA - Monetary Policy Accommodates Fiscal Regime, FA - Fiscal Policy
Accommodates Monetary Regime.
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Table 5: Unconditional Variances and Welfare with Full Credibility
Regime Output Inflation Interest Rate Tax Rate Welfare Cost
Low Volatility
Commitment 1.37 0.06 0.16 3.53 2.45
OF/MC 1.23 0.16 0.24 4.00 2.48
PF/MC 1.34 0.24 0.33 7.08 2.56
OF/LC 0.93 0.70 0.69 4.71 2.58
PF/LC 1.23 1.17 1.15 6.59 2.70
Discretion 1.03 1.52 1.37 6.46 2.75
AF/MC 3,64 0.36 0.49 0.0004 2.84
AF/LC 3.36 2.10 2.23 0.0004 3.00
High Volatility
Commitment 1.63 0.16 0.50 4.58 24.28
OF/MC 1.43 0.31 0.52 4.66 24.46
PF/MC 1.60 0.42 0.64 7.40 24.62
OF/LC 1.09 1.31 1.11 5.20 24.71
PF/LC 1.43 1.81 1.64 7.13 24.91
AF/MC 3.95 0.52 0.80 0.0004 24.96
Discretion 1.20 2.71 2.14 6.92 25.24
AF/LC 3.66 2.63 2.69 0.0004 25.28
Key to the Table: AF - Active Fiscal, PF - Passive Fiscal, OF - Optimal Fiscal Policy
(Stackelberg Leadership), MC - More Conservative Optimal Monetary, LC - Less Conservative
Optimal Monetary, Commitment - Cooperative Ramsey Policy, Discretion - Cooperative
Time-Consistent Optimal Policy.
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